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THE DEBT  CRISIS  of the less developed  countries  broke  out in August 1982, 
with the announcement  by Mexico that it would be unable  to meet debt 
obligations  then falling due. Since then, more than forty developing 
countries  have been forced to reschedule  debts with commercial  bank 
creditors  and to seek additional  lending  and other forms of relief from 
the international  financial  community.  ' From the inception  of the debt 
crisis, the primary  U.S. concern has been the risks to the major  U.S. 
commercial  banks, whose exposure in the developing countries has 
significantly  exceeded their  total bank  capital. 
Table 1 shows the exposure of the U.S. banks in the major  debtor 
countries  at the end of 1986.  The exposure  is divided  by size of bank  (the 
nine  largest  banks, as against  the rest of the U.S. banks)  and by type of 
claim  (on the public sector, as against  the private sector). The concen- 
tration  of the claims is high: the exposure of the top nine banks in just 
the top four countries, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela, 
accounts  for $41  billion,  or 45  percent  of total  U.S. bank  exposure  shown 
in the table. The top nine banks account  for a remarkable  65 percent  of 
total exposure  of U.S. banks in Latin America. Sovereign  loans, those 
to foreign  public  sector  borrowers,  account  for about  two-thirds  of U.S. 
bank  lending  to the less developed countries  (LDCs).2 
1. See Jeffrey  Sachs, "Managing  the LDC Debt Crisis,"  BPEA,  2:1986,  pp. 397-431, 
for  an  overview  of the  debt  crisis  and  the  management  of the  crisis  by the  creditor  countries. 
2. To give an idea of the global distribution  of bank claims in the problem  debtor 
countries,  Latin  America  has about  $200  billion  of bank  debt  outstanding,  of which  about 
$75  billion  is owed  to U.S. banks,  $30  billion  to Japanese  banks  (with  $13  billion  in Mexico 
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Table 1.  Claims of U.S.  Banks in the LDC Debtor Countries, End-1986 
Millions of dollars except  as noted 
Secondary  market 
Claims  of  Claims  of  Bid  Value  of 
top nine banks  all other  banks  pricea  all public 
Country  Public  Other  Public  Other  (dollars)  debt 
Argentina  3,961  1,967  1,677  919  47.0  2,650 
Bolivia  41  2  34  19  10.0  8 
Brazil  10,176  5,183  3,822  3,229  55.0  7,699 
Chile  2,850  1,296  1,097  1,219  67.0  2,644 
Colombia  968  560  236  384  81.0  975 
Costa Rica  204  10  169  33  33.0  123 
Dominican  Republic  286  35  78  28  42.0  153 
Ecuador  1,161  197  712  101  45.0  843 
Gabon  34  10  3  0  82.0  30 
Guatemala  28  7  14  30  72.0  30 
Honduras  84  19  33  38  38.0  44 
Ivory Coast  217  57  74  17  60.0  175 
Jamaica  158  13  24  9  37.0  67 
Liberia  24  493  5  126  5.0  1 
Malawi  25  12  1  4  74.0  19 
Mexico  8,960  4,393  5,571  4,732  53.0  7,701 
Morocco  405  282  65  140  65.5  308 
Nicaragua  17  8  41  0  5.0  3 
Nigeria  404  263  144  92  28.0  153 
Panama  261  1,117  114  701  64.0  240 
Peru  511  307  383  145  11.0  98 
Philippines  2,611  1,092  942  462  67.0  2,381 
Poland  290  73  89  17  43.0  163 
Romania  93  22  14  1  1  87.0  93 
Senegal  20  2  6  0  61.0  16 
Sudan  31  6  1  1  2.0  1 
Uruguay  653  45  162  69  68.0  554 
Venezuela  4,206  2,301  1,355  1,251  67.0  3,726 
Yugoslavia  965  350  413  337  70.0  965 
Zaire  8  4  1  0  24.5  2 
Zambia  69  4  2  2  18.0  13 
Total  39,721  20,131  17,282  14,116  ...  31,878 
Percent  of capital  85  43  25  20  .  .  .  27 
Sources:  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council,  "Country  Exposure  Lending  Survey:  December 
1986,"  Statistical  release  E-16 (126) (April 24,  1987); Salomon  Brothers,  Inc.,  Indicative  Prices for  Less  Developed- 
Country Bank Loans  (July 27,  1987). 
a.  Bid price for a $100 claim on the secondary  market as of July 1987. 
and $10 billion  in Brazil),  $40 billion  to U.K. banks, and the remaining  $55 billion  or so 
divided among German,  French, Canadian,  Swiss, and other banks. The estimate for 
Japan  is from  Japan  Economic  Institute,  "Japan's  Response  to the LDC  Debt  Crisis,"  JEI 
Report  29A  (July  31, 1987),  and  for  the United  Kingdom  from  Maxwell  Watson  and  others, 
International  Capital  Markets:  Developments  and Prospects, 1986,  Occasional  Paper  43 
(International  Monetary  Fund,  December  1986). Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  557 
The debt management  strategy  pursued  by the United States and  the 
official financial community since 1982 has been geared toward the 
protection of  the large commercial banks, at least on a  short-run 
accounting basis.3 U.S.  policy has been to maintain  current interest 
servicing  by the debtor countries to the U.S. banks and to avoid any 
explicit debt forgiveness or even capitalization  of interest payments.4 
U.S. regulators  have applied  lax prudential  standards  to banks  with  large 
LDC exposures, allowing  them  to carry  almost  all such exposure  on the 
books at face value, though  its value on the secondary  market  is heavily 
discounted. Banks have also been allowed to count as current  income 
all the interest  payments  they receive on the loans, even those payments 
made  possible only by new "involuntary"  loans to the debtor  country. 
By acting  as if all is normal,  the regulators  have hoped  to accomplish 
three  things:  to keep the debtor  countries  from  halting  interest  payments 
or promoting  alternative  proposals for debt forgiveness; to keep the 
banks  from  withdrawing  precipitously  from  the debtor  countries;  and  to 
keep depositors and other creditors of the banks from withdrawing 
precipitously  from  the  banks.  In  a limited  sense that  strategy  has  worked. 
Worst-case scenarios of financial panic have been avoided, and the 
banks have been given time to increase their capital ratios. U.S. bank 
exposure in the problem  debtor countries as a percentage  of the book 
value of primary  capital  has declined significantly  since 1982,  as shown 
in table 2. The regulatory  laxness may, however, have hindered the 
adjustment  of the U.S. banks to the crisis by allowing them to move 
slowly in rebuilding  their capital base. Some banks have paid unduly 
large  dividends  at the expense of their capital  in recent years, because 
they have been allowed  to overstate  their  economic incomes. 
However  well the regulatory  treatment  has papered  over the crisis, it 
has not solved it. Nor has it hidden  that  fact from  the debtors,  the banks, 
or the marketplace.  Despite the official optimism  of the United States 
and the creditor  community  regarding  the debt crisis and despite the 
seemingly  relaxed  attitudes  of the U.S. regulators,  most market  partici- 
pants have conceded that much of the LDC debt will not be repaid. A 
3. See Sachs, "Managing  the LDC Debt Crisis." 
4. Debt forgiveness  refers  to any restructuring  of the debt that  reduces  the expected 
discounted  value  of future  payments.  Interest  capitalization  refers  to any  scheme  by which 
a portion  of interest  due is automatically  relent  to the debtor  for later  payment.  Interest 
capitalization  is distinguished  from "involuntary  lending"  packages,  in which loans are 
made  on an ad hoc basis so that  the country  can finance  some of the interest  due. 558  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 2.  Exposure in the Debtor Countries as a Percentage of Bank Capital, Various 
Periods,  1982-86a 
Region  End-1982  Mid-1984 End-1986 
All U.S. banks 
All LDCs  186.5  156.6  94.8 
Latin America  118.8  102.5  68.0 
Africa  10.2  7.7  3.2 
Nine major  banks 
All LDCs  287.7  246.3  153.9 
Latin America  176.5  157.8  110.2 
Africa  19.3  14.3  6.0 
All other banks 
All LDCs  116.0  96.1  55.0 
Latin America  78.6  65.2  39.7 
Africa  3.8  3.3  1.3 
Addendum 
Total bank capital 
(billions of dollars) 
All U.S.  banks  70.6  84.7  116.1 
Nine  major banks  29.0  34.1  46.7 
All other banks  41.6  50.6  69.4 
Source: Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council, "Country  Exposure  Lending  Survey," April 25, 
1983,  October  15, 1984,  and April  24, 1987,  issues. 
a. Exposures  are total amounts  owed to U.S. banks  after adjustments  for guarantees  and external  borrowing. 
Total  exposures  are  calculated  for  all LDCs  (OPEC,  nonoil  Latin  America,  nonoil  Asia, nonoil  Africa);  Latin  America 
(nonoil Latin America  plus Ecuador  and Venezuela);  and Africa  (nonoil  Africa plus Algeria,  Gabon, Libya, and 
Nigeria). 
good indicator  of long-term  expectations regarding  LDC claims is the 
price of those claims on the secondary market. Column 5 of table 1 
records the secondary  bid price for a $100 claim, as of July 1987. The 
price for claims on Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico is in the range of 
$45-$55. The average  price  for the entire  U.S. bank  portfolio,  weighted 
by exposure in the various  countries, is $55.90  per $100  claim. The $57 
billion of U.S. bank exposure to foreign governments  in table 1 has a 
secondary  market  value of $31.9  billion.5 
5. Since the analysis  in this paper  was completed,  the secondary  market  prices have 
fallen  further  for most of the debtor  countries.  As of October  6, 1987,  Salomon  Brothers 
quoted  the following  prices for the largest  countries:  Argentina,  34; Brazil, 38; Mexico, 
47; and the Philippines,  55. Some of the reasons for the further  drop between July and 
October 1987  include:  the toughening  of the Brazilian  negotiating  position  in the fall of 
1987  (including  Brazil's  call for a major  conversion  of debt  to exit bonds  at below-market 
interest  rates);  the Peronist  electoral  victory  in Argentina  in September  1987;  the political 
instability  in the Philippines;  and  the sharp  rise in U.S.-denominated  interest  rates. Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  559 
Although  many bankers  and U.S. administration  spokesmen try to 
argue  that the secondary market  price of U.S. debt is a poor guide to 
more  general  market  sentiments  concerning  the LDC  debt, stock market 
prices of the commercial  banks closely reflect the secondary market 
valuation  of the LDC exposure. As pessimism  has grown  over the value 
of the LDC claims in banks' portfolios, equity prices of banks have 
dropped.6 
The fact that stock market prices have been discounted helps to 
explain  the current  eagerness of banks  to sell their LDC exposures at a 
discount,  since they can accept  a capital  loss in the books without  further 
depressing  their market  value. Citicorp's decision this past spring to 
increase its loan loss reserves against Latin American exposure (an 
action that was followed by the other major  banks in the United States 
and abroad)  appears  to be a prelude  to a policy of selling off the LDC 
exposure  at a significant  discount. As we discuss later, this new policy 
of selling  off debt may have important  implications  for public  policy in 
this area. 
We organize  our discussion of these developments in the following 
manner.  First, we briefly  consider  the underlying  causes of the growing 
market  discount on the LDC debt. Then we turn  to an analysis of how 
the banks  and regulators  have responded  to the crisis since 1982.  Next, 
we examine  the evidence that the stock market  is now valuing  the LDC 
debt at the substantial  discounts reflected in the secondary market. 
Finally,  we explore  the implications  of the market  discount  for the future 
of debt  negotiations  and  for debt relief. 
Why the LDC Debt Sells at a Discount 
The  shortcomings  of the current  U. S. debt  management  strategy  have 
not gone unnoticed.  In a 1986  study Sachs pointed out that most of the 
optimistic  assessments of the debt crisis ignored  the internal  economic 
dislocations  caused  by the large  debt  overhang.7  Most  optimistic  observ- 
6. An initial  attempt  to analyze the links of stock market  prices and LDC debt was 
carried  out by Steven  Kyle and  Jeffrey  Sachs, "Developing  Country  Debt  and  the Market 
Value  of Large  Commercial  Banks," Working  Paper  1470  (National  Bureau  of Economic 
Research,  September  1984).  That study, which used data through  1983:3,  also found a 
significant  negative  effect of LDC  exposure  on bank  share  prices. 
7. See Sachs, "Managing  the LDC Debt Crisis." 560  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
ers have viewed  the debtor  countries'  problem  purely  in  terms  of external 
parameters such as OECD growth, world interest rates, and global 
commodities  prices. They have failed to take account of the economic 
and  political  disarray  within  the debtor  countries  that  has resulted  from, 
or has at least been greatly aggravated  by, the debt crisis: low rates of 
national saving and investment, large budget deficits, and recourse to 
inflationary  finance.8 
Most of the LDC debtors have little real prospect of servicing the 
interest  due on their  external  debt in the next few years. In the past five 
years, they have made  significant  net resource  transfers  to the creditors. 
Latin  America,  for example,  has transferred  about  5 percent  of GNP  per 
year. But despite these transfers, the debt-export  ratios of the major 
debtor  countries  have risen, not fallen. (See table 3.) 
Recent increases in certain  primary  commodity  prices, apparently  in 
a lagged  response  to the depreciation  of the dollar,  gave rise to hope that 
the export prospects of the LDCs would improve.  Ironically,  however, 
most of the price increases  have been for nonfood  primary  commodities 
produced  mainly  in the developed countries  or in the Asian developing 
countries, most of which are not in crisis.9  The prices for sugar,  wheat, 
beef, coffee, and cacao, the main  Latin American  commodity  exports, 
continue  to be deeply depressed. Moreover,  international  interest  rates 
have risen significantly  during  1987. 
Many of the major  debtor countries are in fiscal turmoil,  even after 
sharp  cuts in government  spending  in recent years. The interest  due on 
the foreign debt constitutes such a large proportion of government 
expenditures  (around  30 percent  in many  of the debtor  countries)  that it 
stands  in the way of budgetary  reform.  '0 The voters in the new democra- 
cies in Latin America  are not content to absorb  further  fiscal austerity 
8.  Of  course, many  of these problems  predated  the debt  crisis and  indeed  contributed 
to the onset of crisis, a point  stressed  in Jeffrey  D. Sachs, "External  Debt and  Macroeco- 
nomic  Performance  in Latin  America  and  East Asia," BPEA,  2:1985,  pp. 523-64. In most 
cases, the excessive budgetary  deficits  reflect  deep social  and  political  divisions  within  the 
debtor  countries  that have been exacerbated  by the need to service a heavy foreign  debt 
burden. 
9.  In Latin  America,  Chile  has been the main  beneficiary  of the rise in metals  prices, 
since copper  accounts  for more  than  40 percent  of Chile's merchandise  exports. Copper 
prices have risen  from  an average  of 640  per pound  in 1985  to a price  of 91? per pound  in 
October  1987. 
10. For a discussion of the budgetary  burden  resulting  from the foreign debt, see 
Helmut Reisen and Axel Van Trotsenburg,  "The Budgetary  and Transfer  Problem  of Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  561 
Table 3.  Ratio of External Debt to Exports,  1982, 1984, 1986, and 1987a 
Percent 
Country  1982  1984  1986  1987b 
Argentina  405  461  536  554 
Brazil  339  322  425  471 
Chile  333  402  402  370 
Colombia  191  254  198  235 
Ecuador  239  259  333  464 
Mexico  299  292  413  366 
Nigeria  84  158  300  310 
Peru  269  356  497  551 
Philippines  269  309  308  309 
Venezuela  84  158  322  278 
Total  264  290  385  385 
Source:  Morgan  Guaranty  Trust Company  of New York, World  Finanicial  Markets  (June-July 1987), p. 4, 
table  6. 
a. The debt-export  ratio is the average  gross external  debt as a percentage  of exports of goods, services, and 
private  transfers. 
b. Projections. 
for the sake of foreign creditors. The recent rise in interest rates will 
intensify the fiscal pressures. The large fiscal deficits are now being 
financed  in large part through an expansion of credit by the central 
banks, a process that will result in high inflation. For several years, 
inflation  has been at triple-digit  annual  rates in Argentina,  Brazil, and 
Peru. It topped a 150  percent annual  rate in the spring  and summer  of 
1987  in  Mexico. The  20,000  percent  hyperinflation  in Bolivia  was brought 
under  control only after Bolivia stopped all interest payments on the 
external  bank  debt. 
One  result  of the internal  economic  disarray  has been a burgeoning  of 
unilateral  actions on the debt, particularly  in the democratic  countries 
in Latin  America.  Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican  Republic, 
Ecuador,  Honduras,  and  Peru  have all unilaterally  suspended  part  or all 
of the interest servicing  on their foreign debt in the past two years. In 
Argentina  and Mexico, the two major  debtor countries that have not 
suspended,  the banks  found it necessary in 1987  to relend much of the 
interest  due in order to forestall a unilateral  suspension of payments. 
Major  Debtor  Countries"  (Paris:  OECD  Development  Centre, 1987),  and Jeffrey  Sachs, 
"Trade  and  Exchange  Rate  Policies  in Growth-Oriented  Adjustment  Programs,"  Working 
Paper  2552  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  April  1987). 562  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Mexico received  approximately  $6  billion  in bank  credits, and  Argentina 
recently signed  an agreement  for $2 billion  in new bank  credits.  "  I 
Three other large debtors, Chile, the Philippines, and Venezuela, 
have been servicing  their  debts recently  without  substantial  refinancing 
of interest. Chile, of course, is not so much  a model debtor  country  as a 
model  authoritarian  country  whose government  can impose  the requisite 
domestic austerity to make it possible to service the debt.'2 In the 
Philippines,  internal  instability  at  first  prevented  the Aquino  government 
from taking a tough stand with creditors. The government therefore 
signed  a rescheduling  agreement  in 1987  with no concerted  lending  from 
the banks.13  But there is now a good chance that a unilateral  partial 
suspension  of debt  servicing  will  be declared  by the Philippine  Congress. 
In Venezuela, as well, the government  is under  fierce  political  pressure 
to abandon  its recent debt rescheduling  agreement. Even the govern- 
ment's own political party has called for reopening negotiations to 
achieve debt relief. 
In debt agreements  negotiated  in the past year, the banks have lost 
ground.  In  the  first  round  ofreschedulings,  in 1983,  debt  was recontracted 
with an interest rate spread  of about 2 percentage  points over LIBOR 
(the London Interbank  Offered  Rate). In the second round  of resched- 
ulings, in 1984-85, the spread  fell to about 1.2 percentage  points. In the 
recent round, the spread has fallen further, to less than 1 percentage 
point. Similarly, commissions have declined, and the maturities  and 
grace  periods  on the rescheduled  debts have also increased.  14 
11. These amounts correspond  to approximately  one year's interest payments on 
medium-  and  long-term  sovereign  debt. 
12. Moreover,  the banks  more  than  fully refinanced  Chile's  interest  payments  during 
1983-84  (that  is, the "concerted  lending"  to Chile  in 1983-84  exceeded Chile's interest 
payments),  so that Chile actually  received a net resource  transfer  from  the commercial 
banks  as late as 1984.  Interestingly,  concerted  lending  to Chile  has been  more  generous  on 
average  (when  the new lending  is measured  as a ratio  to the existing  debt)  during  1983-86 
than  has concerted  lending  to any other  problem  debtor  country. 
13. In her speech upon the opening of the Philippine  Congress, President  Aquino 
declared,  "We cannot  help  but  feel our  foreign  creditors  took undue  and  unfair  advantage 
of the internal  differences  we had  with  factions  intent  on subverting  this Government  and 
destroying  our democracy."  (As quoted  in the Financial Times,  July 28, 1987.)  The first 
act of both houses of the new Philippine  Congress  was to call for an investigation  into the 
foreign  debt. 
14.  See  Watson,  International  Capital  Markets,  1986,  for  details  on  spreads  and 
maturities  in debt reschedulings  through 1986. See  "The Risk Game: A Survey of 
International  Banking,"  Economist  (March  21-27, 1987),  p. 18,  for an update. Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  563 
It is thus not difficult  to understand  the growing discount on LDC 
paper in the secondary market.  The economies in most cases are not 
getting better, and the countries are increasingly demanding more 
concessions in reflection of that reality. Moreover, the international 
macroeconomic  environment,  particularly  regarding  interest rates and 
commodity  prices, remains  unsatisfactory.  Detailed  price  quotations  on 
the secondary  market  have been available  only for the past year, with 
several  investment  banks  now circulating  price  sheets, but  all  indications 
are that the discount has been growing  and the prices falling over the 
past  few years, as shown in table 4. 
On a cross-country  basis, the discount on the LDC debt, denoted 
Price, can be explained as a function of four variables:  the debt-GNP 
ratio,  D/GNP (the  debt-export  ratio  works  about  as well);  the rate  of real 
GNP  growth  between 1980  and  1985,  GNPGROWTH;  a dummy  variable, 
SUSP, indicating  whether  the country  has unilaterally  suspended  debt 
service payments; and a dummy variable, ATRR, indicating  whether 
U.S.  bank regulators  have mandated  an allocated reserve, that is, a 
write-down,  for the country's assets on the books of the U.S. banks. 
The following  simple  regression  model accounts well for the secondary 
market  prices as of July 1987.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
Price  =  77.2  -  9.6  ATRR -  17.2  SUSP  -  0.15  D/GNP 
(16.3)  (1.2)  (6.3)  (2.7) 
+  2.2  GNPGROWTH, 
(2.2) 
R2=  0.84; 28 observations. 
The dummy  variable  SUSP  equals 1 if the country suspended  interest 
payments  in 1987, and 2 if the country suspended interest payments 
before 1987  and  is still in suspension. According  to the equation,  a $100 
claim  on a debt-free  LDC with 6 percent  annual  growth  would  command 
a secondary  market  price of $90.40 [$77.20 +  (6 x  2.2)]. On the other 
hand, a country like Bolivia, with a debt-GNP ratio of  136.8, real 
GNP  growth  of - 4.5 percent  a year, a required  write-off  for U.S. banks 
(ATRR  =  1), and more  than  two years in debt suspension  (SUSP  =  2), 
has a predicted price of $2.78 [$77.20  -  9.6  -  (17.2  x  2)  -  (0.15  x 
136.8) -  (2.2 x 4.5)], compared  with an actual  price of $10. 
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Table 4.  Secondary Market Bid Prices for LDC Debt, Various Periods, November 1985- 
October 1987a 
Dollars 
November  August  April  July  October 
Coluntry  1985  1986  1987  1987  1987 
Argentina  n.a.  66  60  47  34 
Brazil  75-83  76  63  55  38 
Mexico  78-82  56  59  53  47 
Peru  32-36  n.a.  17  11  5 
Ecuador  n.a.  65  56  45  30 
Sources:  November  1985, from Economist  (16 November  1985); August  1986, from Euromoney  (August  1986), p. 
71;  1987 figures from Salomon  Brothers,  Inc.,  Indicative  Prices for  Less  Developed  Country Bank Loans  (April 20, 
1987; July 20,  1987; and October 6,  1987). 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  Figures are the bid price for a $100 claim on the secondary  market. 
the  role  of SUSP. On  its face, the pricing  equation  suggests  that  a country 
can manipulate  the secondary market  price of its debt by suspending 
debt servicing. To the extent that debt service relief is then tied to the 
secondary market price of debt, as in some of the relief proposals 
discussed later, there might  be the moral  hazard  problem  of countries 
unilaterally  suspending  debt payment  as a strategic  maneuver  to benefit 
from relief. The moral  hazard  argument  is overdrawn,  however, to the 
extent that  S USP is proxying  for other  country  characteristics  that  make 
debt servicing  particularly  difficult  for that  country:  political  instability, 
adverse export structure,  financial  collapse, and so forth. In that case, 
SUSP is simply another indicator of "ability to pay," rather than a 
manipulable  strategic  variable. 
Patterns of Debt Management  by the Banks and Bank 
Regulators 
In response to the debt crisis, U.S.  banks have virtually stopped 
making  new loans to the problem  debtor countries, with the little new 
lending  that remains  being confined  to specific bailout  packages. Bank 
earnings,  for the most part, did not suffer until 1987, when banks set 
aside reserves to cover possible losses on LDC claims. Under pressure 
from regulators, the banks increased their primary  capital base and 
thereby  reduced  the ratio  of LDC exposure  to capital. Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  565 
BANK  EXPOSURE  IN  THE  LDCS 
The change in bank lending is illustrated  in table 5. Although the 
widely  publicized  negotiated  loan agreements  are  termed  "new money'" 
packages, U.S. bank exposure to the problem  debtor countries fell in 
absolute  dollar  amount  during  1982-86,  after  rising  rapidly  during  1979- 
82. The absolute  decline in lending  belies the myth that the banks have 
continued throughout  the crisis to provide net "new money" to the 
debtor countries, though at a reduced rate of increase. The widely 
publicized  concerted  lending  agreements  in  recent  years  have  been loans 
to governments.  As table 5 shows, claims on the public sector rose 53 
percent during 1982-86. But claims on the private sector declined 48 
percent. At the same time that the banks have been providing "new 
money" to governments, they have been withdrawing  loans from the 
private  sector. Three other factors can also account for the differential 
growth in claims on the public and private sectors. To some extent, 
private  sector debts have become public sector debts as governments 
have taken over some of the foreign obligations of the private sector 
since  the beginning  of the debt  crisis. Secondly, the decline  in exposures 
to the private sector represents, in part, a write-off of claims on the 
private  sector, rather  than an amortization  of loans. Third, declines in 
exposure  also reflect  sales by the banks  of their  LDC claims, or declines 
due to debt-equity  swaps. Given the published  data it is impossible to 
distinguish  changes  in exposure due to new loans, amortizations,  write- 
offs, sales, swaps, or public  sector assumptions  of private  sector debt. 
The notion of "new money" is also misleading  because most "new 
money" packages after 1982 have involved considerably  less in new 
loans than is due to the same creditors in interest. Thus, even when 
Mexico or Argentina  gets a so-called new loan after months of hair- 
raising  negotiations,  the check is still written  by the debtor  government 
to the commercial  bank.  Technically,  the net resource  transfer  (equal  to 
new lending  net of amortizations  and interest payments)  to the debtors 
is negative.  These negative net resource transfers  point up one of the 
fallacies  in a popular  argument  against  LDC default-that  if a country 
defaults,  it will be not be able to attract  new bank money. Losing new 
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Table  5.  Changes  in Bank  Loan  Exposure,  1979-86 
Percentage  change  in  Percentage  change  in 
exposure,  1979-82  exposure,  1982-86 
Country  Total  Public  Private  Total  Public  Private 
Argentina  71  165  41  4  84  -44 
Bolivia  -  31  -8  -  54  -  75  -- 70  -  84 
Brazil  50  78  38  10  92  - 36 
Chile  147  17  226  6  267  - 50 
Colombia  47  83  35  - 33  19  - 57 
Costa Rica  -  12  27  - 35  -  16  42  - 81 
Dominican  Republic  33  10  65  -  15  49  -75 
Ecuador  29  22  33  7  147  -  77 
Gabon  -33  -35  2  -72  -76  -30 
Guatemala  -47  57  - 54  - 60  27  - 75 
Honduras  -  34  30  -  57  -9  17  -  38 
Ivory Coast  46  42  63  -43  -41  -50 
Jamaica  11  8  19  - 22  -05  - 68 
Liberia  -  16  -  43  -  15  -  67  -  55  -  67 
Malawi  - 20  -41  46  - 54  -49  -61 
Mexico  113  131  102  -3  50  -38 
Morocco  15  -23  121  18  27  9 
Nicaragua  - 2  70  -76  - 84  - 84  - 84 
Nigeria  149  54  501  - 51  - 39  - 63 
Panama  31  485  24  -  61  -  3  -  65 
Peru  82  27  139  -47  - 2  -72 
Philippines  43  99  18  -  11  45  -53 
Poland  -  18  13  - 33  - 69  -44  - 89 
Romania  - 31  - 28  - 34  - 50  -  15  - 79 
Senegal  - 1  -  35  251  -  62  -  38  -94 
Sudan  8  28  -56  -  82  -  83  -  67 
Uruguay  230  492  65  1  28  - 59 
Venezuela  34  28  38  -21  15  -47 
Yugoslavia  --71  - 85  - 64  -  11  250  - 64 
Zaire  -39  -37  -73  -91  -94  21 
Zambia  25  -  11  231  - 60  - 39  -92 
Overall exposure  42  52  36  -  12  53  -48 
Sources:  Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council,  "Country  Exposure  Lending  Survey,"  various 
issues. 
interest  payments  achieved by default  exceeds the new money that the 
country  is able to borrow  by not defaulting. 
The pattern  of concerted  lending  packages  among  the debtor  govern- 
ments also illustrates  the venerable  economic adage, "If you owe your 
bank  ?100, you're in trouble;  if you owe your  bank  ?1,000,000,  then he's Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  567 
in trouble."  Very systematically,  it is the countries  with large  debts that 
have  been able  to bargain  for new lending  from  the banks.  This  is evident 
from the data in table 6. For each country, we measure the size of 
concerted  loans in year t, CLI,  as a proportion  of disbursed  debt at the 
end of year t -  1, D_ 1. On average, the ratio CL,/D,  -1  is far higher  for 
the large debtors, Argentina,  Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, than for the 
rest. Venezuela  is a significant  exception to this rule, since the current 
Venezuelan  administration  has, curiously,  never  tried  to bargain  for new 
money. To summarize  the data in table 6, the fifteen small debtor 
countries  in the table had 3.4 percent  of the debt at the end of 1983,  but 
received  only 0.3 of the concerted  loans during  1986. 
BANK  EARNINGS 
Ironically, during 1982-86 the debt crisis did not have a serious 
adverse  effect  on the reported  current  earnings  of the banks,  even though 
it called  into question  their  very solvency. While  doubts  grew about  the 
long-term  willingness  of the debtor  countries  to service their debts and 
while  principal  repayments  were postponed  for many  years  in the course 
of reschedulings, most LDCs continued to service the interest due, 
though  sometimes  only after  the banks  loaned them some of the money 
to do so. Even when interest  payments  were clearly tied to new loans, 
the bank  regulators  allowed the banks to report  the interest  received in 
full as current  income, rather  than, for example, requiring  that part of 
the interest be allocated to loan loss reserves, and therefore not be 
counted  as current  income. 
As shown  in table  7, reported  net income rose between 1980  and 1986 
for all of the nine major banks, with the conspicuous exception of 
BankAmerica,  which  suffered  major  losses on  its domestic  loan  portfolio. 
In some cases the measured  income was even enhanced  by the crisis, 
because  in 1983  and 1984  many  of the rescheduling  agreements  involved 
significant  front-end  fees and an increase in the interest rate spreads 
built  into  the loan  agreements.  As table  8 shows, the share  of LDC assets 
on a nonaccrual  basis at the end of 1986  is only slightly  higher  than the 
ratio  of domestic  loans on a nonaccrual  basis."5 
15. Nonaccrual  loans are loans in which interest servicing is behind schedule or 
sufficiently  sporadic  so that  interest  is credited  to the bank  only as it is received (that  is, 
on a cash  basis),  rather  than  the more  typical  procedure  of crediting  interest  as it accrues. 568  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 6.  Medium-Term Concerted Lending as a Percentage of Debt Outstanding 
from Private Financial Institutions, 1983-86 
Percent 
Average, 
Country  1983  1984  1985  1986  1983-86 
Argentinaa  12  18  0  0  8 
Bolivia  0  0  0  0  0 
Brazil  11  14  0  0  6 
Chile  35  16  9  0  15 
Colombia  0  0  29  0  7 
Congo  0  0  0  9  2 
Costa  Rica  0  0  0  0  0 
Dominican  Republic  0  0  0  0  0 
Ecuador  20  0  0  0  5 
Gabon  0  0  0  0  0 
Guatemala  0  0  0  0  0 
Honduras  0  0  0  0  0 
Ivory  Coast  0  0  4  0  1 
Jamaica  0  0  0  0  0 
Liberia  0  0  0  0  0 
Madagascar  0  0  0  0  0 
Malawi  0  0  0  0  0 
Mexico  11  6  0  8  6 
Morocco  0  0  0  0  0 
Nicaragua  0  0  0  0  0 
Nigeria  0  0  0  4  1 
Panama  0  0  3  0  1 
Peru  16  0  0  0  4 
Philippines  0  18  0  0  5 
Senegal  0  0  0  0  0 
Sudan  0  0  0  0  0 
Togo  0  0  0  0  0 
Uruguay  18  0  0  0  5 
Venezuela  0  0  0  0  0 
Yugoslavia  41  0  0  0  10 
Zaire  0  0  0  0  0 
Zambia  0  0  0  0  0 
Sources:  Authors'  calculations  with  data from  World  Bank,  World Debt  Tables:  External  Debt  of  Developitng 
Couintries, 1986-1987 (World Bank,  1987); World Bank,  World Debt  Tables, Second  Siupplement (World Bank,  1987); 
and  Maxwell  Watson  and  others  Internzational Capital  Markets:  Developments  and  Prospects,  1986,  Occasional 
Paper 43 (IMF,  December  1986). For each  year,  we  calculate  the ratio of the concerted  loan CL, to the disbursed 
debt at time t-  1, D,t  1. 
a.  In 1987 Argentina received  a concerted  loan amounting to 5 percent of its  1986 outstanding loans. Jeffrey Sachs  and Harty Huizinga  569 
Table 7.  Bank Reported Net Income,  1980-87 
Millions of dollars 
Bank  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987a 
Citicorp  449  531  723  860  890  998  1058  -999 
BankAmerica  643  445  390  391  346  337  -518  -929 
Chase Manhattan  354  412  308  430  406  565  585  -832 
Manufacturer's Hanover  229  252  295  337  353  408  411  -  1103 
J. P. Morgan  342  348  394  460  538  705  873  952 
Chemical  174  205  241  301  341  390  402  -703 
Security Pacific  181  206  234  264  291  323  386  112 
First Interstate  225  236  221  247  276  313  338  -  165 
Bankers Trust  214  188  223  260  307  371  428  -151 
First Chicago  63  119  137  184  86  169  276  -438 
Sources:  Compustat data base and Keefe,  Bruyette,  and Woods,  Inc.,  Keefe Natiotznvide  Bankscatn (July 17, 1987). 
a.  Projected. 
Table 8.  Percentage of Bank Exposure to Latin America on Nonaccrual and Percentage 
of Other Bank Assets on Nonaccrual, End-1986a 
Latin  Other 
Bank  debt  assets 
Citicorp  3.8  1.6 
BankAmerica  6.1  3.6 
Chase Manhattan  3.0  2.0 
Manufacturer's Hanover  0.8  3.0 
J. P. Morgan  1.8  0.8 
Chemical  1.3  2.3 
Security Pacific  1.6  1.9 
First Interstate  4.4  1.7 
Bankers Trust  3.5  1.5 
First Chicago  2.4  2.1 
Average  2.9  2.0 
Source:  Based on data from Salomon  Brothers,  Review  of Bankperformiance, 1986 (Salomon  Brothers,  1987). 
a.  Nonaccrual  loans are loans  in which  interest is credited  by the bank on a cash  basis  rather than as it accrues. 
Latin exposure  includes loans to Argentina,  Chile,  Mexico,  and Venezuela. 
In assessing the effects of the debt crisis on measured  earnings,  one 
must draw a distinction  between the bank claims on the public sector 
and those on the private sector. For the sovereign, or public sector, 
loans, the vast bulk of interest due has been paid on a timely basis. 
Among the major  debtors before 1987, only Argentina  fell behind on 
interest  payments  on sovereign debt, in 1984  and early 1985. Brazilian 
sovereign debt has been in suspension since February 20, 1987. By 570  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
contrast,  private  debtors  in Argentina,  Mexico, and  Venezuela  have had 
periods of fairly significant  arrearages  on their debt, though  by the end 
of 1986  most of those arrearages  had  been eliminated.  Also, an unknown 
proportion  of the private  debt has been lost forever in the form of firm- 
level bankruptcies  or in debt workouts with the creditors at slightly 
concessionary  rates. 
Only  in 1987  have the income  statements  of the banks  begun  to suffer, 
as some of the larger  debtors,  especially  Brazil,  have suspended  interest 
payments  and,  more  important,  as banks  have made  significant  additions 
to loan loss reserves. Because of loan loss provisions, the large U.S. 
banks  posted losses of about  $10  billion  in the second quarter  of 1987. 
It is useful here to make clear the meaning  of the recent additions  to 
loan  loss reserves  by Citicorp  and  the other  leading  banks.  Table  9 shows 
the size of the additions  and the share  of Latin  American  exposure that 
is now covered by the reserves. That share  is calculated  by subtracting 
all domestic nonperforming  assets from the banks' total loan loss 
reserves. The net reserves  are  then  compared  with the exposure  in Latin 
America. Citicorp's stated goal was to cover 25 percent of its Latin 
American  exposure. 
Since the loan loss reserves are "unallocated," that is, not tied to 
particular  loans, or even to particular  countries, they do not involve a 
write-down  in value of particular  assets. More obviously, they do not 
involve any forgiveness  by the banks of any part of the debts owed by 
the developing  countries.  The increase  in unallocated  reserves reduces 
reported  income  of the banks,  but  it does not reduce  taxable  income. On 
the balance  sheet, the increase  is a transfer  from  shareholders'  equity  to 
loan loss reserves. It does not affect measured  primary  capital of the 
bank because U.S. bank regulators  count loan loss reserves as part of 
primary  capital. 
The addition  to reserves does not affect the cash flow of the banks. In 
that sense it is a cosmetic move only. In the future,  if the banks  write  off 
some portion of their LDC exposure, either by selling the assets at a 
discount or by settling  with the countries  at below-market  terms, they 
will be able to charge  the losses to the loan reserves without  any effect 
on reported  income. At that  point, however, the capital  base of the bank 
would shrink,  and  the taxable  earnings  of the bank  would  fall in line with 
the write-off. Thus, by accepting  large reported  losses now, the banks 
will be better  placed to report  positive earnings  in the future,  even if the 
LDC loans go sour. Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  571 
Table 9.  Bank Loan Loss Reserves, Net and as a Percentage of Latin Exposurea 
Millions of dollars except  where  noted 
Net  r  eser ve 
Loan  loss  Domestic  as percent- 
Loan loss  +  reserve  -  nonper-  Net  loan  age  of ex- 
reserve,  additioni,  forminig  loss  posure  to 
Bank  end-1986  1987  assets  reserve  Latin fouir 
Citicorp  1,698  3,000  2,022  2,676  27 
BankAmerica  2,172  1,100  3,148  124  2 
Chase  Manhattan  1,065  1,600  980  1,685  26 
Manufacturer's  Hanover  1,008  1,700  1,761  947  14 
J. P. Morgan  910  0  316  594  14 
Chemical  669  1,100  1,015  754  18 
Security  Pacific  729  500  1,132  97  7 
First  Interstate  536  750  1,238  48  4 
Bankers  Trust  591  700  526  765  28 
Average  1,042  1,161  1,349  854  16 
Sources:  Authors'  calculations  with  data  from  New  York Times,  July  2,  1987; Salomon  Brothers,  Reviewv of 
Bankperformance,  1986. 
a.  Data on  loan loss  reserves  are updated through July 2,  1987; all other data are for end-1986.  Latin exposure 
includes loans to Argentina,  Brazil, Mexico,  and Venezuela. 
CAPITAL  ADEQUACY 
Even before the debt crisis hit, U.S. bank  regulators  had  judged that 
the capital-asset  ratios  of U.S. banks  were insufficient.  New regulations 
promulgated  in the early 1980s  called for a rise in the ratio of primary 
capital  to total assets, from  the prevailing  low levels of about  4 percent 
to levels of 5.5 percent.  Total capital  (primary  capital  plus certain  types 
of qualifying  subordinated  debt)  was required  to rise to 6 percent  of total 
bank  assets. 
A vast literature  on banking  regulation  has stressed the need for such 
prudential  limits.16 Banks are highly leveraged institutions, subject to 
the possibility of large fluctuations  in net worth and also to various 
incentive  problems.  A small decrease in the average value of a bank's 
assets can dramatically  reduce  the bank's net worth  and even drive the 
bank into bankruptcy.17  Moreover, because banks are operating  with 
borrowed  funds  and  because most of those funds are insured  by federal 
deposit insurance, bank managers may have the incentive to  take 
16. For  agood  discussion  of the  issues, see George  J. Benston  and  others,  Perspectives 
on Safe & Sound Banking: Past,  Present,  and Future (MIT Press,  1986). 
17. Consider  a bank  that  has  deposits  of $95,  loans  of $100,  and  primary  capital  (in  this 
case equal  to shareholder's  equity)  of $5. A 5 percent  reduction  in the value of the assets 
wipes  out 100  percent  of the bank  capital. 572  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 10.  Bank Primary Capital as a Percentage of Total Assets,  1980-86 
Bank  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Citicorp  3.8  4.1  4.2  4.9  5.9  6.2  6.8 
BankAmerica  4.0  3.9  4.3  5.1  5.8  6.1  6.9 
Chase Manhattan  3.8  4.2  4.7  5.4  6.4  6.9  7.0 
Manufacturer's Hanover  3.6  3.8  4.6  5.0  5.7  6.3  7.2 
J. P. Morgan  4.7  5.1  5.6  6.9  7.0  8.0  8.3 
Chemical  3.7  3.9  5.0  5.5  6.3  7.0  7.2 
Security  Pacific  4.9  4.7  4.9  5.3  5.8  6.4  6.4 
First Interstate  5.1  5.0  5.0  5.8  6.1  6.2  6.1 
Bankers Trust  3.5  4.0  4.5  5.6  6.2  6.4  6.5 
First Chicago  4.7  4.3  5.0  5.6  6.1  7.2  8.3 
Average  4.2  4.3  4.8  5.5  6.1  6.7  7.1 
Source: Salomon  Brothers,  Review  of Banzkperfor,nance, various  editions. 
excessive gambles  if bank  capital  is too low a share  of total assets. If the 
gamble goes well, the shareholders  enjoy an enormous proportional 
return  to their claims. If the gamble  goes poorly, the shareholders  lose 
only the small amount of the net worth, and the deposit insurance 
institution  must make  up the difference  to the depositors. 
Another aspect of prudential  supervision, one that was obviously 
overlooked  in the 1970s  and  early 1980s,  is the requirement  that  the bank 
not commit  more  than 15  percent  of its capital  in loans to any borrower. 
In fact, the loans to the Brazilian government and to the Mexican 
government  greatly  exceeded 15  percent  of capital  for many  of the large 
U.S. banks,  but  the rule  was not invoked  because  the regulators  allowed 
the banks to treat the various official borrowers, such as parastatals, 
central  government,  and development  banks, in Mexico and Brazil as 
distinct borrowers even though they were all backed by the same 
government  guarantee.  In  the  event, all  of the  loans  to all  of the  borrowers 
went bad at the same time. The multiple  borrowers  indeed reflected  a 
single risk, as might  have been expected. 
On paper, the capital adequacy rules have been enforced, and the 
capital  base of the U.S. banks  has been strengthened.  But at least some 
of the improvement  reflects  accounting  conventions  rather  than  an  actual 
strengthening  of bank balance sheets. For bank capital to protect the 
bank from bankruptcy  and to forestall adverse incentive problems, it 
should  consist mostly of shareholders'  equity, and it should  be properly 
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Table 11.  Bank Shareholders' Equity as a Percentage of Total Assets,  1981-June  1987 
June 
Bank  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 
Citicorp  3.6  3.7  4.3  4.2  4.4  4.6  2.7 
BankAmerica  3.4  3.7  4.2  4.3  3.8  3.8  3.0 
Chase Manhattan  3.9  3.9  4.3  4.5  5.0  5.1  3.2 
Manufacturer's  Hanover  3.2  3.9  4.2  4.3  4.6  5.0  2.7 
J. P. Morgan  4.5  4.6  5.7  5.7  6.3  6.6  6.2 
Chemical  3.5  4.1  4.5  4.9  4.9  5.1  3.0 
Security  Pacific  4.0  3.9  4.4  4.2  4.5  4.5  3.3 
First Interstate  4.3  4.4  4.7  4.9  5.1  4.9  3.3 
Bankers  Trust  3.9  3.7  4.4  4.6  4.9  4.7  3.4 
First Chicago  3.7  3.9  4.8  4.8  5.3  5.9  n.a. 
Average  3.8  4.0  4.6  4.6  4.9  5.0  3.4 
Source:  New  York Times, July 2,  1987; and Salomon  Brothers,  Reviewv  of Batnkperformatnce,  various editions. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
requirements  includes both equity and loan loss reserves. Thus, even 
when  the banks  make  loan  loss provisions  because  they anticipate  future 
losses on assets, measured  primary  capital is unaffected, because the 
loan  loss provision  involves a transfer  between shareholders'  equity  and 
loan loss reserves, both of which are fully counted in primary  capital. 
Moreover,  because the LDC claims are carried  in the books at full face 
value, and until recently were not covered by loan loss provisions, the 
book values of shareholders'  equity  clearly  overstated  the market  value 
of shareholders'  equity. 
Thus, U.S. banks  enjoyed rising  capital-asset  ratios during  1982-86, 
as shown in table 10, but suffered a significant  decline in the ratio of 
shareholders'  equity  to assets as of mid-1987  (table 11),  when the banks 
made  a substantial  increase  in loan loss reserves. The conclusion  seems 
to be that  the regulators  have raised  the ratio  of shareholders'  equity to 
total assets but little in the 1980s.  Because the loan loss reserves on the 
Latin  American  claims still cover no more than 25 percent of the Latin 
exposure  and because the markets  are signaling  a discount  on the debt 
of perhaps  45 to 50 percent, it seems clear that shareholders'  equity is 
still overstated  on account of the LDC debt, even after  the additions  to 
loan  loss reserves. 
Regulatory  laxness, a "business  as usual" attitude,  certainly  contrib- 
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their  equity base. It was clear from the beginning  of the debt crisis that 
at least some of the interest  earnings  on the LDC debt should  have been 
regarded  as fictitious, particularly  when leading debtors required  new 
involuntary  loans to meet interest  payments  on existing debts. Prudent 
regulators  might  have required  that the banks  build  up capital  in part  by 
reducing  dividend  payouts. But the major  banks have maintained  divi- 
dend  payout  ratios  since 1982  as if the debt crisis had  not occurred,  as is 
evident in table 12. BankAmerica  was particularly  flagrant.  Even when 
its earnings  were falling  because of bad domestic loans, not to mention 
bad  foreign  loans, it continued  to pay significiant  dividends,  leading  to a 
sharp  rise in the ratio of dividends  to income. Now the bank is fighting 
for survival. 
Our conclusion that banks have rebuilt  capital slowly must be tem- 
pered  to the extent that  other  assets of the banks  are undervalued  on the 
books relative to true market values. One reason to think that other 
assets are indeed undervalued  is that, as we show in the next section, 
the market  values of many  of the large  banks  were at or above their  book 
values as of the summer  of 1987, despite the clear evidence that the 
market  values of their  LDC claims  were far  below their  book values. 
We attempted  to create an equity-asset  ratio  based solely on market 
values rather  than  book  values, by calculating  the market  value  of overall 
bank  assets as the sum of the market  value of bank  equity and the book 
value of bank liabilities. We assumed that the banks' liabilities, which 
are  mostly short-term  fixed-income  liabilities,  have a market  value equal 
to book value. We then took the ratio of the market  value of equity to 
the constructed  market  value of assets. We found that on average for 
the ten large banks, the ratio of equity at market  value to assets rose 
from 3.2 percent in 1983  and 3.6 percent in 1984  to 5.5 percent in June 
1987, suggesting some real increase in capital adequacy. The sharp 
decline in the stock market  in October 1987 has probably  pushed the 
market-based  ratio of equity to assets back down sharply,  close to the 
levels of 1984. 
There  would be one practical  implication  for LDC debt management 
if the banks' non-LDC  claims are carried  on the books at below-market 
value. As the losses on the LDC assets are realized, for example, by 
sales of debt  in  the secondary  market,  the banks  would  be able  to cushion 
the effect on their overall capital by selling off other assets that are 
undervalued  on the books and  taking  the capital  gains. Citicorp  began  to 
adopt this strategy  in the fall of 1987  by selling a part of its real estate Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  575 
Table 12.  Dividend Payout Ratios for Ten Banks with Large LDC Exposure,  1980-86 
Bank  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Citicorp  35  37  31  29  32  32  35 
BankAmerica  33  50  59  70  86  -  43a  0 
Chase Manhattan  28  27  44  32  41  30  31 
Manufacturer's Hanover  37  37  38  37  45  38  37 
J. P. Morgan  35  37  37  36  34  29  27 
Chemical  31  29  34  34  36  34  34 
Bankers  Trust  20  28  27  27  27  26  26 
Wells Fargo  36  36  33  33  32  30  28 
Marine Midland  23  26  28  29  38  29  28 
Irving Bank  28  28  37  36  36  32  31 
Average  31  33  37  36  41  3lb  28 
Source:  Salomon Brothers, Review  of Bantkperformanice,  various editions. 
a.  BankAmerica paid a dividend of $1.16 per common  share despite  losses  of $2.68 per share. 
b.  Excluding BankAmerica. 
equity at a significant  capital gain to offset the reported  losses on its 
LDC  portfolio. 
PENDING  REGULATORY  DECISIONS 
Two important  regulatory  matters are now pending. The first, and 
specific, matter  is the accounting  treatment  of the Brazilian  debt. The 
federal  bank  regulators  can require  the banks to make allocated provi- 
sions for loans to foreign governments  under the system of Allocated 
Transfer  Reserve Risks (ATRR) established in the 1983  International 
Lending  Supervision  Act. In this system, an interagency  committee of 
the Federal  Reserve  Board,  the Federal  Deposit Insurance  Corporation, 
and  the Comptroller  of the Currency  can declare  the loan to a country  to 
be value-impaired  and  compel  a write-down  of the assets. Generally,  for 
loans to be declared  value-impaired  they must meet more than one of 
four  conditions:  interest  is more  than 180  days overdue;  the country  has 
no International  Monetary  Fund  program  and  no prospect  of negotiating 
one; the country  has not met its rescheduling  terms for a year; and the 
country has no definite prospect for an orderly restoration of debt 
servicing  in the near  future.  18 The final  decision is at the discretion  of the 
18. Forafurtherdiscussion,  see MaxwellWatson,  Peter  Keller,  and  Donald  Mathieson, 
International Capital Markets: Developments  and Prospects,  1984, Occasional  Paper 31 
(IMF,  August  1984),  pp. 17-18, and later issues; and "U.S. Bank  Regulators  are Called 
Likely  to Require  Write-Down  of Brazil  Loans," Wall  Street  Journal,  September  1, 1987. 576  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
bank regulators.  Typically, the required  write-off is 10 percent in the 
first year and 15 percent in the second year and each succeeding year 
that the loans are deemed to be value-impaired.  The ATRR has so far 
been applied  only to a few smaller  debtor  countries:  Bolivia, Nicaragua, 
Peru, Poland,  Sudan,  and  Zaire. 
Brazil's suspension of interest payments on its sovereign debt was 
announced  on February  20, 1987.  On April  2, several banks  announced 
that they were placing Brazilian  loans on a nonaccrual  basis. As of 
August 20, 1987,  the loans were in suspension of interest  for 180  days. 
The interagency  task  force met in October  of 1987  to decide whether  the 
Brazilian  debt should  be declared  value-impaired.  An interim  arrange- 
ment that, if carried  out, will provide for a partial  payment of interest 
due in 1987  will forestall  a declaration  that  the Brazilian  loans are value- 
impaired  until  the task force meets next, in the spring  of 1988. 
The second, much more general, matter  is capital adequacy regula- 
tions. The Federal  Reserve  Board  and  the Bank  of England  have recently 
agreed to harmonize  their accounting  treatment  for the supervision  of 
capital adequacy. The details of the agreement have not been fully 
worked  out and  are in any event not yet public. It is expected, however, 
that the new system will weight assets by quality to provide a more 
refined  measure  of bank  capital. 
Existing accounting  practices differ markedly  in the two countries. 
Now, for  instance,  the Bank  of England  requires  that  loan  loss provisions 
of U.K. banks  against  LDC  debts  be allocated  by country.  The  provisions 
are charged against the capital base of the bank and may be charged 
against  current  income  for tax purposes. Recently, moreover,  the Bank 
of England  has instituted  a scoring system by which the U.K. banks 
must evaluate their risks on all LDC loans, and thereby decide upon 
reserve levels. 
Latin American Exposure and the Market Valuation of 
Commercial  Banks 
The regulators  and banks have so far operated  as though  claims on 
the LDCs are  worth  their  full  face value, despite  overwhelming  evidence 
to the contrary. The stock markets, however, have seen through  the Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  577 
accounting  veil and written  down the value of banks with heavy expo- 
sures  in the problem  debtor  countries. 
A precise estimate of the stock market  valuation  of the LDC claims 
is  difficult because data are limited: banks are required to  report 
exposures in the LDCs only when total loans to a country exceed 1 
percent  of total  assets. Therefore,  while much  is known  about  the cross- 
bank exposures of individual  banks in Argentina,  Brazil, Mexico, and 
Venezuela, little is known about the claims by individual  banks on the 
other  problem  countries,  which  account  for  about  30  percent  of exposure, 
as shown  in table 1. 
An initial  look at bank share prices confirms  that the markets  have 
reacted to the bad news of recent years. Table 13 compares prices, 
earnings, and dividends of  nine banks with the heaviest recorded 
exposure in Argentina,  Brazil, Venezuela, and Mexico with those of 
nine banks with no exposure. For the heavily exposed banks, with an 
average  exposure  of 130  percent  of book value, the average  ratio  of stock 
market  value to book value at the end of 1986  was 1.0, compared  with 
1.5 for the banks with zero exposure. Similarly,  the heavily exposed 
banks  had  a price-earnings  ratio  of 6.6, compared  with 10.3  for  the banks 
with zero exposure. The difference  in market  value is not a function  of 
the difference  in current  earnings,  but rather  the price  that  the market  is 
assigning  to those earnings.  Put  another  way, the market  is casting  doubt 
on the future  earnings  of the heavily  exposed banks  by capitalizing  those 
banks  at a lower price-earnings  ratio. 
The last two columns  highlight  two considerations  discussed earlier. 
With  the exception of BankAmerica,  with its extremely  weak domestic 
portfolio,  the heavily exposed banks had a rate of earnings  relative to 
book value  that  is comparable  to that  of the banks  with zero exposure- 
yet another  indication  that through  the end of 1986  (before  the loan loss 
reserves in 1987  and the Brazilian  moratorium)  the debt crisis posed a 
problem of future earnings, not current earnings. The last column 
highlights  the fact that  the dividend  payout  ratios  of the heavily  exposed 
banks have not been systematically lower than those of the lightly 
exposed  banks.  The  two exceptions  are  BankAmerica,  which  suspended 
its dividend  in 1986,  and First Security-Utah, which paid dividends  in 
excess of current  earnings  in 1986. 
More generally, bank analysts concur that the current  market dis- 
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Table 13.  Comparing Banks with Large Exposure and No Exposure in Latin America 
Stock 
Exposure-  price-  Earnings- 
book  book  Price-  book  Dividend- 
value  value  earnings  value  earnings 
Bank  ratioa  ratiob  ratioc  ratiod  ratioe 
Banks  with large exposure 
Citicorp  1.2  1.1  6.6  0.12  0.38 
BankAmerica  1.7  0.5  5.4  -0.17  0.00 
Chase  Manhattan  1.4  0.8  5.1  0.12  0.33 
Manufacturer's  Hanover  1.8  0.6  4.7  0.12  0.37 
J. P. Morgan  0.9  1.8  9.6  0.17  0.29 
Chemical  1.4  0.8  5.4  0.13  0.37 
Wells  Fargo  0.7  1.6  9.3  0.14  0.31 
Marine Midland  1.1  0.8  6.8  0.11  0.28 
Irving Bank  1.4  0.8  6.1  0.12  0.33 
Average  1.3  1.0  6.6  0.10  0.30 
Banks with no exposure' 
Midlantic Banks Inc.  0.0  1.6  9.5  0.17  0.27 
Michigan National  0.0  1.3  8.5  0.11  0.34 
Meridian Bancorp.  0.0  1.2  10.0  0.14  0.43 
BayBanks  0.0  1.4  9.0  0.13  0.38 
First Security-Utah  0.0  0.9  13.0  0.01  2.68 
State Street Boston  0.0  2.7  15.1  0.16  0.22 
Commerce  Bankshares  0.0  1.1  9.2  0.11  0.29 
Dominion  Bankshares  0.0  1.5  9.3  0.15  0.36 
Amsouth  Bankcorp.  0.0  1.6  9.2  0.16  0.37 
Average  0.0  1.5  10.3  0.13  0.59 
Sources: Keefe, Bruyette,  and  Woods,  Inc., Keefe  Nationwide  Bankscan,  various  issues; and Salomon  Brothers, 
Review  of Bankperformance,  1986. 
a. Exposure  to Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico,  and Venezuela  over bank  book value  for 1986. 
b. Stock price  over per share  book value  as of mid-1987. 
c. Price-earnings  ratio  expected  for 1987  prior  to recent  major  additions  to loan loss reserves. 
d. Per share  earnings  over book value  for 1986. 
e.  Current  annual  dividend  rate  for mid-1987  over 1986  earnings. 
f.  No recorded  exposure  (banks  must  report  LDC  exposure  only when  exposure  exceeds 1  percent  of total  assets). 
secondary market.  19  Such a view helps to explain why, when Citicorp 
unexpectedly announced  a $3 billion increase in loan loss reserves in 
mid-May,  the markets  reacted by raising  Citicorp  prices more than 10 
percent  the week of the announcement.  Clearly,  the announcement  was 
received not as bad news of losses, but as good news of a management 
strategy  to confront  the losses aggressively.  One  investment  analyst  was 
19. Thomas  Hanley  of Salomon  Brothers  is quoted  in Fortune  Magazine  (March  30, 
1987,  p. 104)  as declaring:  "The discount  [in the stock market]  is even greater  than the 
price  concessions  accorded  Third  World  debt  currently  trading  in the secondary  market." Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  579 
quoted  as explaining,  "There  was a huge sigh of relief  that  the bad news 
was out.  "20 
The remainder  of this section presents  regression  results  that  provide 
a somewhat  more  precise estimate  of the market  valuation  of LDC  loans 
to the banks, as implicit in the banks' stock prices. Four parallel 
approaches  yield largely  consistent  results.  The first  approach  estimates 
the market  value of LDC claims  held by various  banks. The second and 
third  approaches  relate the banks' price-earnings  ratio and the returns 
to holding  bank  stocks to measures  of LDC  exposure.  The  final  approach 
studies the movement of bank share prices in response to important 
LDC exposure-related  news. 
VALUING  BANK  ASSETS 
The market  values of the securities  on the two sides of bank  balance 
sheets should  be equal. Thus the market  value of a bank's  assets should 
equal  the market  value of its combined  shareholders'  equity and liabili- 
ties. The  market  value  of a bank's  equity  is observed  in the stock market. 
A bank's  liabilities  are  primarily  short-term  liabilities  such  as customers' 
bank  deposits  and short-term  CDs and  can be assumed  to have a market 
value  close to book value. The market  value  of a bank's  preferred  equity, 
which  for most banks  is less than 10  percent  of shareholders'  equity, can 
also be assumed  equal  to book value.2' 
Using 01 to denote the market value of one dollar of claim on the 
LDCs, with 1 -  01  the market  discount on the LDC claim, and 02 to 
denote  the  market  value  of one dollar  of other  assets, we use the  following 
relationship: 
(1)  MVc  + BVp + BVl =  O1Aldc  +  02Aother, 
where 
MVc = market  value of outstanding  common  equity 
BVp = book value of preferred  equity 
BV  =  book value of liabilities 
Aldc = book value of LDC exposure 
Aother = book value of other  assets. 
20. Michael Metz, portfolio strategist of Oppenheimer  and Co., quoted in Ellen 
Freilich,  "Stock  Prices  Fall Fifth  Session in Row," Washington  Post, May  21, 1987. 
21. This  latter  assumption  is made  to ease problems  of data  collection. 580  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Using Atotal to denote total assets, we can substitute  Atotal -  Aldc 
for  Aother, and divide by Atotal to get the relationship: 
MVc  + BVp + BVl  b  Aldc 
(2)  =-a?+b  Atotal  Atotal 
wherea  =  02andb  =  01 -  02. 
The above equation  is estimated  for a cross section of banks  for each 
of the years 1982 through 1986  and for June 1987. The regression for 
June 1987  uses the end-of-1986  data  for exposure and asset values, but 
uses the June 1987  stock prices to compute  the market  value of assets. 
Because the banks  are required  to disclose LDC exposure to individual 
countries only if exposure is in excess of 1 percent of assets, compre- 
hensive exposure data are available  only for the major  borrower  coun- 
tries. In particular,  Aldc is limited  to include  the exposure  to Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela. That  limitation  introduces  a bias 
in the point  estimate  of b that  we discuss below. 
Table 14 reports the estimation  results. For each of the years 1983 
through  June 1987  the estimated  coefficient  of the exposure-assets  ratio 
is negative and is statistically  significant.  As the coefficient is equal to 
the difference  between  the market  values of other  assets and  LDC  loans, 
it is clear  that  a dollar  on the books to the LDCs contributes  less to bank 
market value than a dollar lent elsewhere. As noted, the exposure 
variable  covers only  about  three-fourths  of LDC  exposure.  The  omission 
of other LDC loans biases the coefficient upward  in absolute value to 
the extent that banks that are heavily exposed in Argentina, Brazil, 
Venezuela, and Mexico are also heavily exposed elsewhere, and to the 
extent that other LDC assets are also selling at a discount. Thus we 
should  adjust  the estimated  coefficient  downward. 
If a bank's exposure to the four major  debtors  were perfectly corre- 
lated  with  other  LDC  exposure,  if the markets  knew about  the remaining 
exposure, and if the rest of the LDC debt sold at the same discount as 
that  of the four  major  debtors,  then  an unbiased  estimate  of b for all LDC 
debt would  be approximately  three-fourths  of the actual  estimate, since 
the four major  debtors  account  for about  three-fourths  of the total bank 
exposure. In the absence of perfect correlation  and perfect knowledge 
of  the rest of the banks' LDC portfolios, an adjustment factor of 
something  greater  than three-fourths  is appropriate.  We decrease the Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  581 
Table 14.  Market Valuation of Bank Assets and Latin Exposure,  1982-June  1987a 
Summary  statistic 
Exposure-assets  Number  of 
Year  Constant  ratiob  R2  observations 
1987c  1.026  -0.576  0.18  33 
(-2.6) 
1986  1.020  -0.610  0.18  33 
(-2.7) 
1985  1.008  -0.456  0.30  48 
(-4.4) 
1984  0.994  -0.223  0.17  50 
(-3.1) 
1983  0.992  -0.174  0.16  50 
(-3.0) 
1982  0.980  0.049  0.01  49 
(0.8) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the sum of the market  value of common  stock plus the book values of preferred 
stock and  liabilities.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b. The exposure-assets  ratio denotes exposure  to Argentina,  Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela  over book 
value  of bank  assets. 
c. Data  through  June. 
point estimate by a factor of 0.8 to get our preferred  point estimate of 
the value of the LDC debt. 
We use the estimates  of table 14  to find  the implicit  market  prices per 
$100  of face value of claim, as shown below. 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987 (June) 
$102  $85  $82  $64  $53  $57 
The series shows that the market  started  discounting  the LDC debt not 
in 1982,  when Mexico first  announced  its inability  to service its foreign 
debt,  but  in 1983.  Ever since 1983  there  has been a trend  towards  greater 
discounts,  a finding  consistent  with  the trend  in secondary  market  prices 
observed  in table  4. 
BANK  STOCK  EXCESS-RETURN  EQUATIONS 
These findings  are supported  by the results of a set of bank stock 
excess-return  regressions reported in table 15. Excess returns for a 
particular  bank in a particular  period are measured as the difference 
between  the holding-period  yield  for  the  bank  (capital  gains  plus  dividend 
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Table 15.  Bank Stock Excess Returns and Latin Exposure, June 1982-June  1987a 
Summnary  statistic 
Exposure-  Number 
book value  of 
Year  Constant  ratiob  Dummyc  CUMd  R2  observations 
1982-87e  0.156  -0.650  -1.851  . . .  0.41  27 
(0.64)  (-  2.54)  (-3.47) 
1982  -0.035  -0.034  . . .  -0.035  0.01  38 
(-0.80)  (-0.69) 
1983  0.266  -0.180  .  .  .  -0.214  0.23  38 
(5.79)  (-  3.26) 
1984  0.387  -0.158  . . .  -0.372  0.02  39 
(2.91)  (-  0.94) 
1985  0.129  -0.049  .  .  .  -  0.421  0.01  38 
(2.56)  (-0.68) 
1986  -0.451  0.070  .  .  ..  0.03  26 
(-  6.92)  (0.83) 
-0.410  0.031  -0.484  -0.390  0.20  26 
(-  6.50)  (0.39)  (-2.23) 
1987f  -0.165  -0.020  .  .  .  ...  0.02  26 
(-  2.37)  (-  0.23) 
-0.111  -0.071  -0.628  -0.461  0.27  26 
(1.74)  (-0.89)  (-2.88) 
Source: Authors'  calculations. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the stock holding  rate of return  (computed  from  stock price change  and dividends) 
minus  the Standard  and  Poor  500  holding  rate  times  the bank  beta  coefficient.  Numbers  in parentheses  are  t-statistics. 
b. Exposure  to Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Mexico,  and  Venezuela  over  bank  book  value.  For  the five-year  regression, 
exposure  for 1984  was chosen. 
c. Dummy  equal  to 1.0 for a Texas bank  (First  City Bank). 
d. Cumulative  negative  excess return. 
e. Data  from  June 1982  through  June 1987. 
f. Data  through  June. 
market  index multiplied  by the individual  bank's beta coefficient. The 
regressions  relate excess return  to the ratio of exposure to Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela to bank book value. The table 
reports an excess-return  equation spanning  the entire 1982-June 1987 
period  and also a set of yearly regressions.  The five-year  excess-return 
regression  and alternative  regressions  for 1986  and January-June  1987 
include a dummy variable  equal to 1 for banks located in Texas. The 
dummy  captures  the effects of the oil slump  on the profitability  of Texas 
banks. 
The five-year  regression  indicates that a bank with an exposure-to- 
book-value  ratio  of 1 would  have suffered  a negative  excess return  of 65 
percent. From the yearly regressions, we find a statistically  significant 
effect of exposure only for 1983. However, the estimated coefficients 
are negative for all years except  1986. By  summing the coefficient Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  583 
Table 16.  Bank Price-Earnings Ratios and Latin Exposure,  1982-June  1987a 
Exposure-  Suimmary statistic 
book value  Number  of 
Year  Constant  ratiob  K2  observations 
1987c  0.628  -3.771  0.29  36 
(13.74)  (-3.71) 
1986  9.703  -3.632  0.20  36 
(10.34)  (-2.95) 
1985  10.264  -4.138  0.41  48 
(20.31)  (-5.63) 
1984  14.674  -5.242  0.04  48 
(4.62)  (-1.31) 
1983  7.662  -1.443  0.09  49 
(13.85)  (-2.10) 
1982  5.839  -0.210  0.02  49 
(28.81)  (-0.91) 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See text description. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the price-earnings  ratio.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b. Exposure  to Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Mexico, and  Venezuela  over bank  book value. 
c. Data  through  June. 
estimates  for each of the years, we can get an alternative  estimate  of the 
cumulative  negative excess return  (CUM) associated with LDC expo- 
sure, as shown in the fourth  column  of table 15. On this basis, by June 
1987  the cumulative  excess return  was - 46 percent  for a bank  with an 
exposure-to-book-value  ratio  of 1. 
PRICE-EARNINGS  RATIOS 
As a third  way to test the relationship  between stock prices and LDC 
exposure, we regress the banks' price-earnings  ratios on the ratio of 
exposure  to the four  major  LDC debtors  to book value. As the sovereign 
borrowers  have been current  in their  interest  payments,  with the major 
exception of Argentina during 1984, earnings associated with Latin 
exposure  have not suffered  much. Low expectations about  future  debt 
servicing, however, should be expected to depress the price-earnings 
ratios. Table 16 shows that the estimated coefficient on the exposure 
variable  is indeed negative for all six years and that it is statistically 
significant  after 1984. 
The relative value of the constant term and the coefficient on the 
exposure  variable  provide  an  indication  of the discount  on LDC  exposure 584  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
relative to other assets. A bank  with no exposure has a price-earnings 
ratio given by the constant  term. A bank  with the same book value but 
with assets that are only LDC claims (with an exposure-capital  ratio of 
1) has a price-earnings  ratio  equal  to the constant  minus  the coefficient 
on the exposure variable.  Assuming  that current  earnings  are propor- 
tional  to book value, regardless  of the distribution  between LDC claims 
and other assets, we can divide the two price-earnings  ratios to get the 
market  price of the LDC claims relative  to the price of other assets (for 
the same size book value of each type of asset). Assuming that other 
assets have a price  of 1 and  that  the coefficient  on the exposure variable 
is overstated  by a factor  of (1/0.8)  for reasons described  earlier,  we get 
the alternative  estimates  of the LDC prices shown below. 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  (June) 
$97  $85  $71  $68  $70  $72 
These estimates are broadly consistent with those from the asset- 
value approach,  though the implied discounts are somewhat smaller. 
Note that  if the measured  current  earnings  on the LDC  assets are smaller 
than  the earnings  on the alternative  assets per dollar  of book value, then 
our  procedures  in this section  would  understate  the discount  on the LDC 
claims. 
PRICES  AND  LDC  DEBT  NEWS 
Movements of bank prices a day or a few days following important 
news about LDC claims also help to bolster the views that the markets 
are sensitive  to the value  of the LDC  claims.  We have already  mentioned 
the  market's  positive  reaction  to Citicorp's  announcement  of the  increase 
in loan loss reserves. Three other examples-the  announcement  of the 
Austral plan in Argentina,  the announcement  of the Cruzado  plan in 
Brazil,  and  the announcement  of Brazil's  unilateral  suspension  of interest 
servicing-reinforce the point. 
On Friday night of June 18, 1985, President Alfonsin of Argentina 
announced an accord with the International  Monetary Fund on an 
imaginative stabilization program and monetary reform. Simultane- 
ously, the U.S. Treasury  announced  in Washington  that  it had  succeeded 
in assembling  a multilateral  $480 million short-term  loan for Argentina 
to  assist with its immediate loan obligations. Even though on the Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  585 
following  Monday  the Wall  Street  Journal  headlined  an article, "Argen- 
tina's Latest Austerity Program  is Greeted with Skepticism by Ana- 
lysts," bank stock prices did well that day. The results of a regression 
of bank  stock returns  on that  Monday  on the ratio  of Argentine  exposure 
to bank  book value is shown in the first  line of table 17. According  to the 
equation,  Argentine  assets rose in market  value approximately  $12 per 
$100  of claims (the coefficient  0.097 is scaled up by the ratio of market 
value  to book value to get 0.12). 
On Monday, March 3, 1986, Brazil announced a similar austerity 
program  that  included  an agreement  reached  the previous  Saturday  with 
foreign  private  creditors.  The agreement  called  for  a reduction  in interest 
payments  of $150 million  in 1985  and 1986  on $1.5 billion of debt and a 
refinancing  of $6 billion  that  matured  in 1985.  The second line of table 17 
shows  that  the combination  of the rescheduling  negotiations  and  the new 
program  was disappointing  to bank stock investors, with bank stock 
returns  on that  day  significantly  negatively  related  to the  banks'  Brazilian 
claims.  Each  $100  of Brazilian  public  claims  is estimated  to have declined 
in value  by $8.10, and  each $100  of private  claims  by $2.70. 
Almost a year later, on Friday, February 20,  1987, the Brazilian 
Minister  of Finance, Mr. Dilson Funaro, sent a telex to Brazil's 700 
creditor  banks announcing  a moratorium  of interest payments on me- 
dium-term  and  long-term  commercial  bank  debt.  The Wall  Street  Journal 
commented  that international  bankers  had grown used to debt alarms 
and  that  they were taking  Brazil's  action  in stride. Indeed, the third  line 
of table 17 shows that on February  20 bank stock returns were only 
weakly negatively related to the ratio of exposure to Brazil to book 
value. However, during  the following week, bank stocks tumbled as 
Brazil  took  further  steps that  indicated  its resolve. On  Monday,  February 
23, Chase  Manhattan  Bank,  Chemical  Bank,  and  Citicorp  each lost more 
than  5 percent  of their  stock values. On  Wednesday,  February  25, Brazil 
tightened  its policy by telling its banks not to repay foreign creditors 
seeking to recall short-term  credit. The fourth line in table 17, which 
relates  the return  on bank  stocks between February  20 and February  26 
to the exposure-book-value ratio, shows that the cumulative effect 
during  the week of Brazil's  interest  moratorium  on bank  stock prices is 
significant  and  highly  negative. 
The fifth  line of the table focuses on the announcement  by Citicorp 
on May 19, 1987,  that it would add $3 billion  to its loan loss reserves in cl~~~~~~~~~~ 
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anticipation  of future  write-downs  of Latin loans. Line 5 relates Latin 
exposure over book value to stock price movements between the day 
before and the day after Citicorp's  announcement.  The added dummy 
variable  is for Citicorp  itself. The regression  shows that.Citicorp  stock 
went up 4 percent, while other banks' stocks went down slightly (and 
without  statistical  significance). 
Stock Market Values and Debt Renegotiation 
The  evidence  on  the  market  value  of LDC  debt  has  a  crucial  implication 
for future  negotiations  between debtors  and creditors,  as well as for the 
policy options of the official community. Since banks' stock prices 
already  reflect significant  losses on the debt, banks should  be willing  to 
trade  their  LDC debt of a given face value for a safer  asset with a lower 
face value.  In  the simplest  case of such  a debt  conversion,  for  the moment 
ignoring  tax and accounting  complications,  if the stock market  values 
the debt at $60 per $100 of face value, then a bank's shareholders  will 
benefit  if the bank  sells each $100  of debt  for cash at any price in excess 
of $60.  Of  course, the swap  need  not  be for  cash;  any  marketable  security, 
such as a bond or an equity claim, with a market  value in excess of $60 
will do. Such a debt conversion could result either  from direct negotia- 
tions between creditors  and debtors  or through  the policy actions of the 
official  community,  as illustrated  below. Several benefits are likely to 
result  from  debt  conversion  schemes that  convert  the current  debt, now 
priced  at a discount,  into cash or into new claims  at a reduced  face value 
that  are  then  priced  near  the new lower face value. We shall  suggest  that 
there  is a strong  case for  policymakers  to take  positive actions  to support 
such debt  conversions. 
DEBT  CONVERSIONS  THROUGH  BILATERAL  DEBTOR-CREDITOR 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Debt conversions may be arranged  directly between debtors and 
creditors  in many ways. The simplest, with a long tradition,  is for the 
debtor  to enter  the secondary  market  for  its debt  and  to repurchase  some 
or  all of the debt  for  cash at a deep discount.  Such  repurchases  of heavily 
discounted  bonds took place in the 1930s. A widespread use of debt 
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A first problem is contractual.  Most of the existing debt contracts 
with the commercial  banks  have a "sharing  provision," which requires 
that all payments  by the debtor  to the creditors  must be equally shared 
by the participating  banks. Technically,  a debt repurchase  violates this 
clause, since the bank  that sells its claim  gets a lump-sum  payment  that 
is not  received  by the other  banks.  The  creditors  and  debtor  can  negotiate 
a waiver to eliminate the sharing provision, though such a waiver 
generally  requires  the nearly  unanimous  consent of the bank  creditors. 
A waiver was negotiated  during  1987  in the case of Bolivia, under  the 
restrictive  condition  that  Bolivia  will repurchase  its debt  only with  funds 
that  have been donated  to Bolivia  by foreign  governments  expressly for 
the purpose  of debt repurchases. 
A second problem involves the regulatory  environment  facing the 
banks. The main  difficulty  is that when a bank sells its claim  for cash, it 
must record  a capital  loss equal  to the difference  of the face value of the 
claim and the purchase  price. This capital  loss reduces the book value 
of bank capital and may trigger  regulatory  problems by reducing  the 
ratio of primary  capital  (measured  at book value) to assets. If the bank 
sells a $100 claim, valued in the secondary market  at $60, for $65, it 
would  enjoy a $5  gain  at market  prices. In book value, however, it would 
have to record  a $35  loss. Although  the stock market  generally  responds 
to the change in market valuation, and not in book valuation, if the 
decline  in book value  were large  enough  to cause the bank  to come close 
to or fall below regulatory  limits on book-value  capital-to-asset  ratios, 
then the freedom  of maneuver  of the bank  might  be  jeopardized. 
Clearly,  the regulatory  environment  imposes  a bias  against  debt  sales, 
since it now allows an asset worth $60 to be held on the books at $100 
until  that  asset is actually  sold  at  its reduced  value. One  possible  response 
of the regulators  could  be to ease the regulations  to allow  the capital  loss 
from debt sales to be amortized over a period of several years, an 
approach  recently introduced  for some kinds of bad farm  loans. Other 
"tricks" are also available  to disguise  the debt repurchase  and avoid an 
immediate  write-down.22 
22. One such trick  is for the debtor  country  to put  the $60  cash in a custodial  account 
managed  by the creditors,  to guarantee  a bond  with  below-market  interest  rates  that  has a 
present  value equal  to $60 (for example,  a $100  face value consol, with a coupon  rate 40 
percent below market  interest rates, that gives the bond a market  value of $60). The 
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A related  regulatory  problem  is that if a bank sells some of its claim 
on a country at a discount, then the regulators  and the bank's own 
auditors  might  force it to write down the rest of its claims  on the debtor. 
Uncertainties  about  the regulatory  response have apparently  prevented 
many  banks  from  selling  off small  portions  of their  exposure  in  a particular 
country. 
A third  problem  with  repurchases  is that  the debtor  country  generally 
does not have the cash available  to make  a major  repurchase  of its debt. 
If the required  cash were available,  the debt itself would likely not sell 
at a deep discount. To the extent that debt conversions are desirable,  it 
might  make sense for the official community  to give or lend money to 
debtors  to make  possible a large-scale  repurchase.  This  is essentially  the 
experiment now under way with Bolivia. We return to the possible 
involvement  of the official community  to support  debt conversions in 
the next section. 
Other  forms of debt conversion have a similar  effect as debt repur- 
chases, though they may be different  in appearance.  In a debt-equity 
swap, for example, a potential  foreign direct investor purchases some 
debt  from  the banks  on the secondary  market  and  brings  the debt to the 
debtor country's central bank. The central bank purchases the debt 
using local currency, under the restriction  that the domestic currency 
then  be used to make  a foreign  direct  investment.  As long as the central 
bank  repurchases  the debt from the investor at close to the secondary 
market  price, that  is, at the price, converted  into local currency,  that  the 
investor paid to the banks, then the transaction  is essentially a cash 
repurchase  of debt when viewed from the perspective of the central 
bank. From the debtor country's point of view, the key, and perhaps 
only, advantage  of such a mechanism  over a direct  repurchase  of debt is 
that it allows the debtor  to get around  the sharing  provision discussed 
earlier.23  Otherwise,  debt-equity  swaps have the same advantages  and 
disadvantages  of direct  debt repurchases. 
face value of $100, but a safe market  value of $60. Under standard  accounting  rules, a 
swap of $100  of debt for $100  of bonds of the same debtor  generally  does not require  a 
write-down  in book  values  of the claim. 
23. Until  recently,  most central  banks  were redeeming  the debt  at close to par,  rather 
than  close to the secondary  market  price, giving  the foreign  investor  the spread  between 
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A new form of debt conversion that may be similar  to a repurchase, 
though  less costly to the debtor  in terms of current  cash flow, is an exit 
bond. With  an exit bond, the creditor  swaps his bank  debt (say, of $100) 
for a bond of the debtor country  with the same face value, that is, the 
same eventual principal  repayment,  but with a below-market  coupon 
rate.  The bond  therefore  has a contractual  present  value  (a present  value 
assuming  no default)  that is below the face value of the existing bank 
debt.24 
Why should  a creditor  swap a bank  loan for an exit bond of the same 
debtor  that  has a lower contractual  present  value?  The bond  is supposed 
to be superior  to the existing  bank  debt  for several  reasons. First, holders 
of the  bonds  are  explicitly  relieved  of the obligation  to make  contributions 
to concerted-lending  packages  that  may  be negotiated  between  the banks 
and the country in the future. Second, the debtor undertakes, either 
explicitly or implicitly,  to give the bonds a senior status relative to the 
remaining  bank debt, that is, to service the bonds before servicing  any 
of the bank  debt. If the senior status  is credible,  the bond may be a very 
safe claim.25 
Third,  as discussed in the next section, the creditors  as a group  may 
benefit  from  the introduction  of exit bonds, since certain  efficiency  gains 
may act as an investment  incentive, though  as with many  incentive  schemes, the largest 
effect was to give a large  lump-sum  transfer  to inframarginal  investors  that would have 
invested in the country anyway. Recently, central banks have been finding  ways to 
recapture  most of the discount  on the debt, either  by repurchasing  the debt  at close to the 
secondary  market  price or by auctioning  the right  to participate  in a debt-equity  swap 
among  potential  foreign  investors,  thereby  recapturing  the surplus  previously  accruing  to 
the foreign  investors. 
24. In contractual  terms, the current  bank  claim  has a present  value equal  to its face 
value, since it carries  a market  rate  of interest. 
25. Consider  the case of Brazil,  for example,  with about  $70  billion  of bank  debt, and 
recent annual  net resource transfers  to the banks of about $6 billion. If Brazil  were to 
convert  $10  billion  of its debt  into exit bonds  with  a long  maturity  and  a fixed  interest  rate 
of 6 percent,  given a safe market  rate of 10 percent,  the interest  due on the bonds would 
be $600  million  per  year. If the $600  million  is credibly  senior  to the remaining  bank  debt, 
there would be little doubt about Brazil's capacity  to service the bonds, since the $600 
million  is far  less than  Brazil's  revealed  annual  capacity  and  willingness  to pay. The  bonds 
would  therefore  be a relatively  safe asset, and  would  therefore  be priced  at about  $60  per 
$100  of principal  (that  is, 0.6 market  interest  rate x $100,  assuming  a long maturity  on the 
bond). Assuming that bank claims on Brazil are now selling at below $60 per $100, 
individual  banks  should  be willing  to swap  their  bank  debt  for the exit bonds. Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  591 
may arise from  the fact that the exit bonds reduce the debtor  country's 
contractual debt service obligations. We shall see  that the debtor 
country's  ability  and  willingness  to service its debts may well rise as the 
contractual  obligations  to do so fall. 
SOME  TAX  AND  REGULATORY  ASPECTS  OF  DEBT  CONVERSIONS 
Two details are important  in understanding  the full regulatory  and 
financial  ramifications  of debt conversions. The first involves book 
accounting. As indicated earlier, debt conversions may or may not 
require  immediate  write-downs of book values of the banks' claims, 
depending  on how the transaction  is carried  out. In general, if an asset 
is swapped  for cash or some nondebt  claim,  the bank  must  book the new 
asset at its current  market  value and  write  down  any difference  between 
the face value of the debt and the market  value of the asset received in 
return.  Thus, if debt  with  face value of $100  is priced  at $60  and  is traded 
for cash or equity  worth  $65, the bank  records  a loss of $35. 
This loss is important  for two reasons. First, it reduces the bank's 
book  capital,  which  is the measure  used  for  regulatory  purposes.  Second, 
it can be charged  against  taxes. If the bank  pays the corporate  tax rate 
on the margin  (34 percent  in 1988),  then the tax savings  would be worth 
$40 x 0.34, or $13.60. Thus, the full value to the bank  of selling  a debt 
for $60 would be $73.60. Put differently,  if the stock market  is valuing 
the debt  at $60, the bank  should  be willing  to sell the debt  for $39  in cash, 
since $39 plus the tax saving of $21-0.34  x  ($100 -  $39)-equals  the 
market  value. 
If the bank  debt  is swapped  for a new form  of debt, however, then the 
accounting  and  tax rules may  be different.  If $100  of bank  debt  at market 
interest rates is swapped for a $100 exit bond with a below-market 
interest  rate, the bank  does not in general  have to write down the value 
of its claim  unless and  until  the exit bond  is sold on the market,  at which 
time the write-off  would be the difference  between $100 and the price 
received  for the bond. This accounting  rule (known  as FASB 15)  gives 
the banks  great  flexibility  with respect to exit bonds. They can choose 
the time  to take  the capital  loss on the debt even after  they swap  the debt 
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WHY  DEBT  CONVERSIONS  ARE  ATTRACTIVE 
Debt conversions can benefit  the creditors  as a group  as well as the 
debtors.26  Most debtor  countries'  current  debt  far exceeds the expected 
discounted  value of net debt servicing,  that  is, debt servicing  net of new 
concerted lending. Keeping on the books debt that is far in excess of 
what can reasonably  be expected to be repaid  entails efficiency losses 
that are often ignored, but are a central aspect of the case for debt 
conversions. 
The  efficiency  losses are  widely  recognized  in  the context  of corporate 
or  personal  bankruptcy,  but  not  yet in the context of excessive sovereign 
debt. There  are  good efficiency  reasons  why a corporation  or individual 
with excessive debts is allowed to discharge  those debts in the context 
of bankruptcy.  In a corporate  Chapter  11 proceeding, it is recognized 
that  economic  efficiency  may  dictate  that  an overly indebted  firm  should 
continue to operate, but that efficient operations require an explicit 
conversion of the debt into claims with a reduced contractual debt 
service obligation.  Otherwise,  the firms  cannot  operate  except in a crisis 
mode: they are denied suppliers'  credits;  they are subjected  to creditor 
lawsuits;  they have a hard  time collecting on accounts receivable;  they 
cannot get new financing  for investment  projects; and they cannot get 
workers  to invest in  job-specific  training.  Bankruptcy  courts do not tell 
the corporation  to continue  to operate  with all of its debt intact, simply 
to roll over the debt and  pretend  that it can service all of the debt in the 
future. It is recognized that the overhang of debt itself prevents the 
smooth  operation  of the firm,  to the ultimate  detriment  of the creditors. 
The same kinds of efficiency losses apply to sovereign debts. The 
overhang  of the debt itself can hamper  economic performance,  even if 
the reality is being concealed by concerted loans or by arrears.  As a 
simple illustration, suppose that a country owes $10 billion of debt. 
Assume that principal  repayments  are always rescheduled  (that  is, that 
the debt  has infinite  maturity).  The  safe market  interest  rate  is 10  percent. 
26. The  argument  in this section, that  debt  relief  can provide  efficiency  gains,  was first 
set forth  in Jeffrey  Sachs, "The Debt Overhang  of Developing  Countries,"  forthcoming 
in  the  memorial  volume  for  Carlos  F. Diaz-Alejandro  to be published  by  the  Wider  Institute, 
Helsinki, Finland, 1988. Another recent paper that explores a similar  theme is Paul 
Krugman,  "Bootstrap  Debt  Relief" (MIT,  1987). Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Hiuizinga  593 
To begin, suppose  that  the country's  annual  debt servicing  capacity, its 
capacity to make a net resource transfer,  is $600 million, assuming  no 
change  in policies. The country  repays  all  that  it can each period,  though 
its repayment  capacity may depend on the kinds of policies that it 
follows. The market  value of the debt would simply be the discounted 
value  of $600  million,  or  $6  billion  at market  interest  rates.  The secondary 
market  price  would  therefore  be $60  per $100  of debt. 
In the present debt-management  arrangements,  assuming  no break- 
down in negotiations,  and  without  debt conversions, the country  would 
pay the full $1  billion  of interest  in the first  year, and  get a concerted  loan 
of $400  million, so that its net resource  transfer  would be $600 million, 
which is its ability to pay. Next year, the debt would be $10.4 billion, 
with interest  due of $1.04 billion. The country would again  make a net 
resource  transfer  of $600  million,  requiring  a new concerted  loan of $440 
million.  Each year the country  would get a new concerted  loan in order 
to keep the net transfer  at $600  million.  The debt would  eventually  grow 
at a rate  approaching  10  percent  per  year, the rate  of interest.  Obviously, 
the debtor  and  creditor  are engaged  in a simple "Ponzi scheme" to hide 
the fact of partial  default. 
Suppose  that, instead, all of the debt were converted  into exit bonds 
with 6 percent interest. The bonds would be perfectly safe, since the 
country  would and could pay $600  million  per year on the bonds. There 
would be no defaults and no concerted lending, because the debt 
conversion  would  obviate  the need  for concerted  lending.  It would  leave 
the position  of the debtors  and creditors  unchanged  with respect to net 
resource transfers  each year. The debt conversion would impose no 
losses to the creditors  regarding  debt service receipts, and would allow 
both  debtors  and  creditors  to avoid  the costs of negotiating  the concerted 
loans each year. 
Perhaps  more  important,  the debt conversion  would avoid the risk  of 
an actual breakdown  in debt negotiations  at some point in the future, 
leading  to an outright  default. The risk of a negotiating  breakdown  is 
present in most kinds of negotations, but is particularly  acute in the 
bargaining  between banks and debtor countries, because both the 
creditors  and  debtors  are negotiating  on a wide variety  of fronts, and so 
have the incentive  to stake out tough  positions to avoid the appearance 
of weakness  in  other  settings.  Actual  breakdowns  of negotiations,  which 
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costly. The debtor's  international  trade  can be hampered  by a drying  up 
of international  trade  credits  or  other  forms  of disruption.  This  disruption 
represents  a dead-weight  loss to both  the debtor  and  the creditors,  a loss 
that can be avoided  by the debt conversion. 
Note that the market  price of debt will in general  reflect  the fears of 
such  a future  breakdown.  In  our  example,  therefore,  in  which  the country 
can service 60 percent of the debt, the market  price of the debt would 
generally  sell at below 60 percent, say $55 per $100. Then, a switch to 
exit bonds would involve a capital  gain from $55 to $60 that would be 
shared  by the creditors  and  debtors. 
Next, suppose that by undertaking  a structural  reform  program  that 
would  require  it to forgo  $100  million  in current  consumption,  the debtor 
country  could raise its output  and therefore  its debt servicing  capacity 
by $20 million this year and every year in the future. Debt servicing 
capacity, and therefore  debt servicing (under  the assumption  that the 
country pays all that it can), would rise to $620 million  per year. The 
secondary  market  value of the debt  would rise to $62  per $100. 
Such a reform  would require  the debtor  to sacrifice  consumption  for 
the sake of the foreign creditors, since the returns to the structural 
reform  effort  would  be appropriated  by future  debt  servicing.  The debtor 
would have little incentive to make such a structural  change, which 
could also be politically  suicidal  if opposition  parties  attack  the govern- 
ment  for sacrificing  current  consumption  for  the sake  of foreign  creditors. 
The assumption  behind  such an attack, that the creditors  would appro- 
priate  a large  portion,  if not all, of the improvements  in the economy, is 
reasonable.  Concerted  lending  and reschedulings  are granted  to coun- 
tries in dire economic difficulties. Once an economy improves, the 
debtor  is expected to service its debts in full, and  its power  to resist debt 
servicing  is diminished.  No player, not the banks, the IMF, the World 
Bank, or the creditor  governments,  will excuse a country  with a healthy 
economy from debt servicing  on the grounds  that it was once in trouble 
and  chose to undertake  needed reforms. 
Could  the reforms  be financed  by the foreign  creditors  to increase  the 
country's  debt  servicing  capacity,  rather  than  reducing  its consumption? 
Probably not. Supposing that $100 million is lent to the country in 
addition to the $400 million of interest refinancing,  with the overall 
concerted loan totaling $500 million. There is no guarantee  that the 
structural  reforms would actually be undertaken.  The country might Jeffrey Sachs  and Harry Huizinga  595 
promise  to undertake  the reforms,  receive the loan, use the money for 
consumption  purposes  instead, and continue to pay $600  million  in net 
resource  transfers  in the future.  It would  benefit  from  this policy choice 
by raising  current  consumption  by $100 million at no real future cost. 
Because promises to reform are notoriously difficult  to regulate and 
because most IMF and  World  Bank  conditionality  requirements  are not 
met by borrowing  countries, it is a good bet that such lending would 
simply  not be undertaken. 
Now suppose  that  the debt-conversion  exercise  is undertaken  instead. 
The contractual  debt burden  is reduced  to $600  million  per year through 
the use of exit bonds. If the country undertakes  the reform effort, it 
would reduce current  consumption  by $100  million,  but increase  future 
consumption  potential by $20 million per year. The foreign creditors 
would no longer appropriate  the benefit, since their claims have been 
reduced  to a fixed $600 million  by the debt conversion. As long as the 
consumers'  rate  of time discount  is sufficiently  low, the reform  will now 
look attractive.  The creditor's  welfare  is unchanged  by the debt conver- 
sion, and  the debtor's  is raised. 
As a result of the efficiency gains, it would generally  be possible to 
structure  the debt  conversion  to benefit  both  the debtor  and  the creditors. 
For example, the debt worth  $60 in this example  could be swapped  into 
exit bonds worth $61 (for example, paying 6.1 percent interest), still 
leaving  the debtor  with enough  incentive  to carry  out the reforms. 
The key point of this extended example is that an overhang  of debt 
creates various inefficiencies. First, it requires  continuous and costly 
renegotiation  of the debt. Second, it raises the specter of a costly 
breakdown  of negotiation,  which  would  disrupt  the  trading  arrangements 
of the debtor, and thereby impose costs on both the debtor and the 
creditors. Third, and perhaps most important,  the debt can act as a 
heavy tax on economic reform. Under the current  arrangements,  the 
returns  to reform  are appropriated  heavily, if not entirely,  by the foreign 
creditors. The result is  twofold: no individual government has an 
incentive  to undertake  adjustments,  and  political  parties  that  are  opposed 
to reform  have an attractive  case to take to the electorate. This latter 
concern  is far  from  abstract.  In recent  legislative  elections, the reformist 
government  of  President Alfonsin in Argentina lost heavily to  the 
Peronists,  who have been arguing  against reforms  to increase foreign 
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A  CRUCIAL  CAVEAT  ON  EXIT  BONDS 
The previous discussion has highlighted  the potential usefulness of 
exit bonds by showing how the conversion of all bank debt into exit 
bonds could reduce the contractual  obligations  of the debtor country 
while at the same time maintaining,  or even raising,  the market  value of 
the resulting  claims held by the creditors.  But in a more  general  setting, 
the conversion of bank debt into exit bonds may result in a fall in the 
value of the creditors' claims rather  than a rise, thereby undercutting 
the case for exit bonds. 
As an illustration,  suppose that a debtor country will be able and 
willing  to repay its debt fully if world commodity  prices recover (prob- 
ability  0.6), and will default  entirely  if commodity  prices stay the same 
or fall further  (probability  0.4). In the secondary market, $100 of debt 
would sell for $60. Now suppose  that  the debt  is converted  to exit bonds, 
carrying  a coupon interest  rate  at 60 percent  of the market  interest  rate. 
The  contractual  present  value  of a $100  long-term  bond  would  be reduced 
to $60. What would be the new market  value of the creditors'  claims? 
Evidently, the new exit bonds would also have a 60 percent chance of 
being fully serviced and a 40 percent chance of being fully defaulted. 
Thus, the exit bonds would sell at a 60 percent discount  relative to the 
contractual  obligations  of the bonds. In other words, the market  price 
would  be 60 percent  of $60, or $36. Obviously,  in this case, the creditors 
lose substantially  by giving up their bank claims worth $60 for an exit 
bond  worth  $36. 
Therefore,  a discount  on the bank  debt in the secondary  market  does 
not mean  that creditors  can automatically  benefit, or at least stay even, 
from a conversion of debt into exit bonds. In the example  just cited, 
there is no efficiency  gain to making  the debt conversion, since payoffs 
depend purely on the exogenous world commodity price, not on the 
policies of the debtor. There is, however, a loss to the creditors, since 
with the conversion to exit bonds, the banks give up the chance of 
receiving  the full $100  repayment  of their  debt in the event of favorable 
world  commodity  prices. Technically,  part  of the value of the creditors' 
claims on the country  is the option value of sharing  in high commodity 
prices. When the debt is  converted into exit  bonds with a lower 
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Exit bonds therefore  have the following  minuses  and  pluses from  the 
perspective  of the creditors  as a group. On the negative side, since exit 
bonds reduce the contractual  present value of future  debt repayments, 
the banks  lose the option  value of getting  fully or substantially  repaid  on 
their  bank  debt  if exogenous  events are  highly  favorable.  On  the positive 
side, the exit bonds  offer various  efficiency  benefits,  which  can raise  the 
market  value of the resulting  claims. To reiterate,  these efficiency  gains 
include:  avoiding  the costs of continuous  debt  negotiations,  avoiding  the 
chance  of a costly breakdown  in  future  debt  negotiations,  and  stimulating 
economic  reform  in the debtor  country.  The  balance  of costs and  benefits 
depends  on the relative  importance  of these considerations. 
We are inclined to believe that the benefits of debt conversion for 
many  debtor  countries  outweigh  the possible costs, though  our reasons 
are necessarily impressionistic  and must be considered on a case-by- 
case basis. The 50 percent discount on bank debt for most countries 
reflects the fact that the debt is twice too large to be serviced with 
regularity,  rather  than  the fact that exogenous events will result  in all or 
no repayment  with probability  0.5. In other words, the option value of 
waiting  for full or nearly  full repayment  is of little value. Moreover, as 
we have pointed out, it is likely to be seriously self-defeating,  since if 
the creditors  wait  for  full repayment,  the debt overhang  will stifle  reform 
and  tend to bring  to power less reformist  and more radical  regimes  that 
indeed  will choose to suspend  all debt repayments. 
Put yet another  way, to the extent that the creditors really face a 
probability  distribution  involving  complete, as against  no, repayments 
on the debt, it is a probability  distribution  that they themselves can 
influence.  A reduction  in the contractual  debt  burden  through  some  form 
of debt  conversion  will bolster  the political  standing  of those who would 
repay  the debt. 
Debt Conversions  and Public Policy 
We believe that  the benefits  of debt  conversion  warrant  public  policy 
action.  At the minimum,  the regulatory  environment  can be modified  so 
that  arbitrary  book-value  calculations  do not stand  in  the  way of desirable 
exchanges. But many commentators  have proposed going further  by 
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popular  proposal,  the debt conversion  would  be intermediated  by a new 
international  debt facility. The facility, which could, for example, be 
part of the World Bank, would accept the exit bonds of the debtor 
country  and issue its own bonds to the commercial  banks in return  for 
the existing  bank  debt, which then would be extinguished.  The country 
would owe money to the facility in the form of exit bonds. The facility 
would owe money to the banks in the form of guaranteed  bonds. The 
banks  would get a safe claim, the bond of the debt facility, rather  than  a 
risky  exit bond of the debtor  country. 
This  proposal  is nearly  identical  to two others. In the first,  the official 
creditor  community,  again, perhaps,  the World  Bank, would provide a 
guarantee  on the exit bonds issued by the debtor  country.  In the second, 
the official creditor community would lend the debtor countries the 
money necessary to make cash repurchases  of debt in the secondary 
market.  In all three  cases, the contractual  burdens  of the debtor  country 
would be reduced  in line with the discount  on its debt in the secondary 
market,  and  the claims  on the debtor  country  would  effectively  be shifted 
to the official  creditor  community  and  away  from  the commercial  banks. 
The cost to the official  community  would  be the difference  in value of 
its own bonds, which are a safe asset, and the exit bonds of the debtor 
country.27  Suppose, for example, that the country's debt now sells at 
$60  per $100. If the facility issues $60 of guaranteed  bonds to the banks 
and accepts exit bonds from the debtor  country with contractual  obli- 
gations also worth $60, that is, the same coupons and principle  as the 
safe bonds, the facility's net worth  will be reduced  if the exit bonds sell 
at a discount  because of default  risk. We have given examples  in which 
the $60 of exit bonds will indeed be worth the full $60, with no costs to 
the facility, and  cases in which the bonds would  be worth  only $36, with 
the facility  losing $24  in present-value  terms. 
Why is such a facility needed at all? The main  reason is that a large- 
scale debt conversion poses significant  collective action problems  that 
can best be overcome with official intervention.  Bankers'  fears about 
regulatory  problems, the legal status of exit bonds, the problem of 
contagion  effects whereby terms to one country influence  negotiations 
27. The facility  might  even sell off some or all of the exit bonds  in the open market  to 
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with other countries, and the difficulty of collective decisionmaking 
among many banks make it difficult to carry out a large-scale debt 
conversion  without  considerable  official  support. 
The likely costs to the official  community  of intermediating  a large- 
scale conversion  would be modest. Suppose that each creditor  country 
participates  in  the  international  debt  facility  in  proportion  to the  exposure 
of its banks in the problem  debtor  countries. As table 1 showed, U.S. 
banks hold approximately  $57 billion in claims on governments  of the 
problem  debtor  countries.  The secondary  market  value of those claims 
was some $32  billion  in July 1987.  If the debt  facility  gave the U.S. banks 
guaranteed  bonds worth $32 billion  in return  for the debt and accepted 
exit bonds  from  the debtor  countries  with contractual  obligations  worth 
$32 billion, the capital cost to the United States would be the market 
discount  from the $32 billion contractual  value. At best, the claims on 
the LDCs would  be worth  the full $32  billion:  there  would  be no residual 
cost to the United States. At the very worst, the bonds would sell at the 
same discount as the original  bank debt, at 55 percent of contractual 
value. The claims  on the LDCs in that  case would  be worth  $17.6  billion, 
and the transaction would cost the U.S.  government $14.4 billion. 
Presumably,  this capital loss could be amortized  over many years, so 
that U.S. taxpayers would end up paying $1 billion to $2 billion each 
year for several years. Such costs could be reduced  further  by condi- 
tioning the debt relief on economic reform measures in each debtor 
country.  (We have stressed that the debt relief itself should strengthen 
the incentives  for actually  carrying  out the reforms.) 
Even this upper limit of $14 billion seems a modest cost to reduce 
LDC debt to the secondary  market  levels for all thirty  problem  debtor 
countries in table 1. The achievement, from the U.S. perspective, is 
considerable:  the debt is  reduced to levels that the market deems 
manageable;  the U.S. banks are taken out of the game, and out of risk, 
without  imposing  further  losses; the elimination  of the debt overhang 
enhances  the possibility  of efficiency gains in the debtor  countries;  the 
political positions of moderates in the LDCs is bolstered; and new 
democratic  regimes  in much  of Latin  America  and  the Philippines  would 
likely  be strengthened  by a reduction  of their  contractual  debt servicing 
obligations.  Finally,  this kind  of relief is an efficient  form  of foreign  aid, 
since  the U.S. contributions  would  also be matched  by the other  creditor 
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Table 18. Secondary  Market  Value  of Claims  of Financial  Institutions  on the Problem 
Debtor  Nations 
Millions  of dollars  except where noted 
Secondary  market 
Debt to  Bid 
financial  priceb 
Country  institutionsa  (dollars)  Total  value 
Argentina  20,395.3  47  9,585.8 
Bolivia  126.3  10  12.6 
Brazil  49,624.7  55  27,293.6 
Chile  12,084.8  67  8,096.8 
Colombia  4,144.2  81  3,356.8 
Costa Rica  1,530.4  33  505.0 
Dominican  Republic  328.4  42  137.9 
Ecuador  4,972.5  45  2,237.6 
Gabon  532  82  436.2 
Guatemala  101.1  72  72.8 
Honduras  164.8  38  62.6 
Ivory Coast  2,486.6  60  1,492.0 
Jamaica  406.5  37  150.4 
Liberia  41.4  5  2.1 
Malawi  53.7  74  39.7 
Mexico  58,757.3  53  31,141.4 
Morocco  2568  65.5  1,682.0 
Nicaragua  1,144.9  5  57.2 
Nigeria  6,515.2  28  1,824.3 
Panama  1,877.6  64  1,201.7 
Peru  3,224.6  11  354.7 
Philippines  4,206.6  67  2,818.4 
Romania  2,261.4  87  1,967.4 
Senegal  233.5  61  142.4 
Sudan  553.6  2  11.1 
Uruguay  1,300.5  68  884.3 
Venezuela  9,968.2  67  6,678.7 
Yugoslavia  4,510.3  70  3,157.2 
Zaire  402.9  24.5  98.7 
Zambia  226.5  18  40.8 
Total  194,743.8  ...  105,542.3 
Sources: World  Bank;  and Salomon  Brothers,  Indicative  Prices for  Less  Developed  Country Batnk  Loatns (July 
27, 1987). 
a. End of 1986. 
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would also be contributing  their share, so that the United States would 
avoid carrying  an undue  part  of the burden. 
The costs, from the point of view of the entire creditor  community, 
are shown in table 18. As of the end of  1986, the world's financial 
institutions, almost exclusively banks, had medium- and long-term 
claims on the governments of the problem debtor countries of $195 
billion, with a secondary  market  value of $105  billion. Thus a complete 
swap of debts into exit bonds for the thirty  countries  in table 18 would 
require  official guarantees  of $105 billion. At best, the capital cost of 
these guarantees  will be zero: the debtor  countries  will fully service the 
reduced  burden  of the exit bonds. At worst, the exit bonds would be 
valued  at essentially  the same discount  as the current  bank  debt, about 
$54  per $100  of face value.28  The international  capital  loss would  thus be 
on the order  of (1 -  0.54) x  $105, or $48 billion  for the entire creditor 
community,  of which  the U.S. share  would  be approximately  $14  billion. 
28. The discount  is slightly  different  from  the discount  for the U.S. banks  because of 
the composition  of the global  portfolio. Comments 
and Discussion 
John B. Shoven: I liked this paper a lot, possibly because I am not 
nearly  as knowledgeable  as the authors  about  this subject,  and  therefore 
I learned a lot. The basic story is not a new one. The policy of bank 
regulators  has been to allow banks  to carry  their  LDC loans at full face 
value and treat the interest flow from them as income, even if that 
interest is largely  financed  by additional  loans. It looks now as though 
the object has been to hide the facts from American  depositors. But I 
have been on this Brookings  Panel  for a long time, and a review of our 
previous insights on this subject  puts things in a different  light. Robert 
Solomon's  conclusion  in the  fall  of 1981,  less than  a year  before  the onset 
of the debt crises, that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, the 
Philippines,  South Korea, and Thailand  were "creditworthy"  met with 
general  agreement  in the discussion. Jeff Sachs noted that only Ghana 
and North Korea had repudiated  their debt in the postwar period and 
that  Ghana  had  later  rescheduled.  Some sympathy  may be due the bank 
accountants  who were carrying  this debt at full value for so long. Now 
that  default  and  severe concessions have become commonplace,  we say 
that the regulators  were trying to hide something. But, at least for a 
while, we too could not see the true  value of these assets. 
The  paper  reviews  the exposure  of U.S. banks,  particularly  the largest 
ones, to Latin  American  debt,  gives us the  value  of that  debt  on secondary 
markets,  and  finds  that  the implicit  value of these loans in the U.S. stock 
market (found by analyzing the market value of the bank stocks) is 
consistent  with the quotes from  the secondary  market. 
For the lay audience, including  myself, some interesting  facts are 
uncovered  along the way. First, both shareholder  equity and loan loss 
reserves count as primary  capital  for the bank. Therefore,  a bank that 
recognizes that it has inadequate  loan loss reserves and increases them 
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does not lower its primary  capital  by doing so. I have to agree with the 
authors  that  this seems a little  crazy  and  that  regulators  should  be looking 
at stockholders' equity in determining  a bank's primary  capital. For 
many  banks  today, the majority  of primary  capital  is loan loss reserves. 
Second, the additional  reserves that Citibank  and others have been 
setting aside are not allocated to particular  loans or even countries. 
Therefore, while they reduce reported income, they do not reduce 
taxable income. And, from the best that I can tell, almost all of these 
banks  are  taxpayers.  This  behavior  is somewhat  curious.  Most of us like 
to report  as small  an income  as possible to the IRS, and  companies  often 
report  lower earnings  on tax account than they report  to stockholders. 
Here,  just the opposite is happening.  The banks  are reporting  large  loss 
set-asides to their shareholders,  without taking  the steps necessary to 
reduce  taxable  income. 
While I learned  much from the Sachs and Huizinga  paper, I would 
like to have learned more. First, I would like to know more about the 
secondary market for LDC debt. What is the volume, who are the 
participants,  what is the bid-ask spread, and so forth? Are the major 
buyers (as well as sellers) of the troubled  loans the commercial  banks? 
Can  the third-world  countries  buy back  their  own obligations  at 56 cents 
on the dollar?  I will say more  about  this in a minute. 
Second, after what the authors revealed about bank accounting 
practices, I was surprised  to find them using (apparently)  book-value 
figures  for shareholders'  equity in table 11, where they are examining 
the adequacy  and composition of primary  capital. Their own table 13 
shows that ratios of market  to book value range widely across banks 
(from  0.5 to 2.7 for the banks  listed). My impression  is that  the ratio  has 
also  changed  through  time  and  that  table 11  understates  the improvement 
of the last few years in shareholder  equity  at market  value. The problem 
of using book figures is illustrated  by their June 1987 number, which 
shows that shareholders'  equity had dropped sharply from year-end 
1986.  This reflects  the loan loss reserves, which are  just a paper  entry, 
and  not the stock market  valuation  of the equity claims  on banks. 
The  authors  find  that  stock  investors  were  not  fooled by the overstated 
income statements  and balance sheets, but suggest that management 
may  have been, at least in the setting  of dividend  policy. I think  they are 
a bit naive here. I would be the first  to admit  that, although  there is no 
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payment  of dividends  does seem to set up expectations  for their  contin- 
uation. The banks have been aggressively trying to sell new equity. 
Several banks are now preparing  new equity issues, and almost all of 
them  have actively  used dividend  reinvestment  plans  to increase  equity. 
Cutting  or eliminating  dividends  in this situation  may appropriately  be 
viewed as a costly strategy  to be followed only if absolutely  necessary. 
The authors  discuss briefly  the idea of an international  debt facility 
that would shift claims on the debtor countries from the commercial 
banks to the official creditor  community.  The idea seems like a good 
one. But if the creditor  countries  participating  in the facility offer only 
market  prices to the banks and borrowers, they are not following an 
aggressive  policy. The governments  are simply  making  official  what the 
markets  have already  recognized.  I fail to see why this price is a natural 
one for the terms  of the debt swap, and  feel that  more  generous  terms  to 
both lenders  and  borrowers  could be considered  by the creditor  govern- 
ments, obviously at substantial  cost to those governments. 
General  Discussion 
Discussion about the relevance of secondary  market  prices on LDC 
debt was spirited. Robert Lawrence noted that the use of secondary 
market  prices  creates  a moral  hazard  by providing  debtor  countries  with 
an incentive  to adopt  policies that  reduce  the market  price of their  debt. 
He suggested  that  relief  should  be based on some concept of sustainable 
debt, rather  than  on the secondary  market  value of LDC loans. Charles 
Schultze added  that, so far as the debtor  countries  have already  antici- 
pated  debt  relief  of the Sachs variety,  they may already  have acted so as 
to reduce the price of their debt. Thus there is no way to know what 
combination  of economic fundamentals  and bargaining  strategy is re- 
flected in present prices. Schultze was also concerned that the use of 
secondary  market  prices would produce  perverse political rewards  by 
providing  more debt relief to those countries  that had done a relatively 
poor  job of managing  their affairs.  To the extent that the U.S. govern- 
ment  wanted  to provide  some subsidy  to the debtor  countries,  he argued, 
it would  be politically  difficult  to do so in a way that  appeared  to bail  out 
the lending banks or that helped debtor countries in relation to those 
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James Duesenberry  supported  the main policy argument  that some 
form of debt relief is desirable, both for its economic benefits to the 
debtor  nations  and  for  its foreign  policy importance  for  the United  States. 
But he reasoned that the market  value of debt and the value of bank 
stocks bear no necessary relation either to the needs of individual 
countries  for aid or to the extent that  banks  should  be helped  out of their 
problem  by the government.  He suggested  that a better  plan  for solving 
the debt problem  might  guarantee  a cross-section of debt and provide 
relief to debtor nations on a basis that is more closely related to their 
individual  needs and  to the scope for economic  improvement  in  response 
to debt relief  in individual  countries. 
Robert Hall extended Sachs's point that the debt relief plan would 
entail  both efficiency  gains and  losses. At present, bank  loans represent 
a call option on the LDCs with adverse incentive effects on their 
performance:  good economic  performance  results  in larger  payments  to 
the U.S. banks, while poor performance  reduces those payments. He 
agreed  with Sachs that a write-down  of the LDC debt could reduce this 
adverse incentive effect, thus providing  a present efficiency gain. But 
Hall noted that future lending would be less efficient because lenders 
would  take  account  of the fact that  previous  contracts  had  been  rewritten 
ex post. Dwight  Jaffee added  that debt relief involving  the sale of bank 
loans  to third  parties  might  reduce  the quality  and  quantity  of LDC  loans 
in the future  because if banks  got rid  of many  existing  loans, they would 
lose their incentive to continue lending  in order to maintain  payments 
on outstanding  loans. 
Paul  Krugman  countered  that  we could conceivably  be on the far  side 
of the "debt-relief  Laffer curve," in the sense that debt relief reduces 
the probability  of default in the future so that the expected value of 
payments on future contracts becomes larger and more secure. He 
emphasized  that that outcome would be far more likely if debt relief 
were made conditional  on economic reforms, as Sachs suggests. How- 
ever, George  von Furstenberg  questioned  whether  any new facility for 
purchasing  debt in Sachs's scheme could enforce such economic re- 
forms, observing that the IMF and World Bank are unable to do so. 
Sachs  reemphasized  that  removal  of the  present  disincentives  to institute 
economic reforms-the  banks' call options to which Hall referred- 
would make the future different from the present, and that further 
efficiency gains would come from reducing  the dead-weight  loss now 
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Several participants  questioned the regression results relating  debt 
exposure  to the market  value of banks. Benjamin  Friedman  warned  that 
regressions  explaining  the excess returns  on bank stocks by their LDC 
debt exposure would be biased if that exposure itself affected the beta 
coefficient that was used in forming  the excess-returns variable. The 
banks' beta could be affected in this way because improving  general 
economic conditions would improve the prospects of debt repayment 
and  thus  benefit  bank  stocks disproportionately.  James  Poterba  reasoned 
that the relation  between bank  exposure to LDC debt and market  value 
or excess returns  would  be exaggerated  by other  portfolio  decisions that 
banks may have been induced  to take because of their large LDC debt 
exposures. Similarly, von Furstenberg  reasoned that the relation of 
market  value to book value of banks  with and  without  large  exposure to 
LDC debt could reflect long-standing  differences in lending behavior 
between major  money-center  banks  and  others. 